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The Development of In Personam
Jurisdiction over Individuals and
Corporations in California:
1849-1970
A recently enacted California Senate Bill,' taking effect July 1,
1970, will significantly change California's general provisions for serv-
ing process and acquiring jurisdiction in civil actions. Of particular
importance is the repeal of Code of Civil Procedure sections 411, 412,
413, and 417.2 In the past, these sections served two important func-
1. S.B. 503 (1969).
2. Portions of those sections pertinent to this article are set out as follows:
Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 1-2, at 343, CA.. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411 (effective until
July 1, 1970): 'The summons must be served by delivering a copy thereof as follows:
"1. If the suit is against a domestic corporation: to the president or other head of the
corporation, a vice president, a secretary, an assistant secretary, general manager, or a
person designated for service of process or authorized to receive service of process ...
If no such officer or agent of the corporation can be found within the State after
diligent search, then to the Secretary of State as provided in Sections 3301 to 3304, in-
clusive, of the Corporations Code ....
"2. If the suit is against a foreign corporation . . . doing business in this state: in the
manner provided by Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code.
"8. In all other cases to the defendant personally." [The portions omitted pertain to
unincorporated associations, foreign partnerships, minors, wards and conservatees, pub-
lic agencies, dissolved corporations, and candidates for public office.]
Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 346, CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 412 (effective until
July 1, 1970): "Where the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state; or has departed from the state; or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the
state; or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons; or is a corporation or unin-
corporated association having no officer or other person upon whom summons may be
served, who, after due diligence, can be found within the state, and the fact appears by
affidavit to the satisfaction of the court, or a judge thereof; and it also appears *
that a cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to
be made, or that he is a necessary or proper party to the action; or when it appears
... that it is an action which relates to or the subject of which is real or personal
property in this state, in which such [defendant] has or claims a lien or interest
therein, or in which the relief demanded consists wholly or in part in excluding such
person or corporation or unincorporated association from any interest therein, such
court or judge may make an order that the service be made by the publication of the
summons."
Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 413 (effective
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tions: First, they prescribed procedures insuring that parties likely to
be affected by judgments of the courts were properly notified; and
second, they delimited the bases on which a California court could
acquire jurisdiction over a defendant. 3  Whereas the delimitations
were previously embodied inconspicuously within these service of proc-
ess sections, they are now defined in a specifically designated code
section.4 To appreciate the significance of the new law, specifically
this new basis of jurisdiction section,5 it is essential to understand
the historical development of the statutes it is replacing and the limita-
tions imposed by those statutes upon California's judicial jurisdiction.6
The emphasis in this historical review is necessarily limited to
specific aspects of a very broad term, jurisdiction.7 A brief review of
until July 1, 1970): "The order must direct the publication to be made in a newspaper,
to be named and designated as most likely to give notice to the person to be served
. * ,*In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant
is known, the court, judge, or justice must direct a copy of the summons and complaint
to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to the person to be served, at his
place of residence. When publication is ordered, personal service of a copy of the
summons and complaint out of the State is equivalent to publication and deposit in
the post office."
Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417 (effective
until July 1, 1970): "Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of
this State by publication of summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413, the
court shall have the power to render a personal judgment against such person only if
he was personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was a resi-
dent of this State (a) at the time of the commencement of the action, or (b) at the
time that the cause of action arose, or (c) at the time of service."
3. See Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to Render Judgments
Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 339,
346 (1958).
4. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970) (basis of jurisdiction
section); id. §§ 413.10, 415.10-.50, 416.10-.90 (operative July 1, 1970) (service of
summons sections).
5. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970): "A court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States."
6. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1969 REPORT TO THE Gov-
ERNOR AND THE LEGISLATIVE, app. II [hereinafter cited as 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT]. "Judicial jurisdiction in its broadest sense is the power of a state, through
any of its courts or, on occasion, through its legislative, executive or administrative
bodies, to create legal interests which will be recognized and enforced in all the
states." Id. at 69.
7. 'The term [jurisdiction] . . . has so many different meanings that no single
statement can be entirely satisfactory as a definition ...
"Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire ab-
sence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject
matter or the parties." Abelleira v. District Court, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 287-88, 109 P.2d
942, 947 (1941). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92
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the theoretical connotations suggested by this term seems appropriate
in order to fit the discussion to follow into the overall picture.
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Perspective
Jurisdiction is essential to a court's ability to render a judgment
that will be recognized and enforced in the state of rendition and all
other states.8 For purposes of discussion, jurisdiction is commonly
divided into two segments: jurisdiction over the subject matter and
jurisdiction over the person9 or thing.10
Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter
Through its constitution and statutes, a state distributes among
its courts the authority to decide the various types of cases that are
likely to arise. A court that has been given the authority to decide a
specific type of case has "subject matter jurisdiction" ' over all cases of
(Proposed Official Draft, 1967) Pt. I, [hereinafter cited as SECOND RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS]; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 4, comment b at 21-22 (1942).
8. "A personal judgment against a defendant over whom the court rendering it
has no jurisdiction is invalid. It is not merely reversible on writ of error or appeal,
but is wholly void for all purposes. An attempt to execute it is without justification; a
sheriff levying upon property of the defendant is liable for conversion, and a purchaser
of the property on execution sale gets no title to it. A court of equity may, where the
remedy at law is inadequate, enjoin the execution of the judgment. No action lies
upon it either in the state wherein it is rendered or in any other state. It cannot be
set up as a bar in a suit upon the original cause of action.
"If these fundamental principles of the conflict of laws are disregarded by a state
court, they may be vindicated in the federal courts, for they are protected by two pro-
visions of the federal Constitution. If a judgment is rendered in one state and an ac-
tion is brought thereon in another state, a federal question is involved under the pro-
vision of Article IV, section I, that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each State to
the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State.' The enforce-
ment of a judgment against a defendant over whom the court has no jurisdiction in-
volves a violation of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall
'deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.' The deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question of jurisdiction over
the defendant are, therefore, under these two provisions, binding upon the states."
Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARv. L. REv.
871, 871-72 (1919).
9. In the following discussion, the word "person" is used to represent artificial
persons (corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations) as well as
natural persons. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 24, comment a at 133.
10. In the following discussion, the word "thing" is used to represent tangible
and intangible property and such other matters in which a state might have an interest,
such as the "status" of its domiciliaries. See CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1917: "The juris-
diction sufficient to sustain a record is jurisdiction over the cause, over the parties, and
over the thing, when a specific thing is the subject of the judgment" (emphasis added).
11. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is referred to alternatively as the com-
petency of the court. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCTS § 92, comment i at
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that type. Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution 12 and
sections 89 and 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure are basic provisions
prescribing original subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases for Cali-
fornia's superior, municipal, and justice courts. 3 These provisions,
and others, base the distribution of subject matter jurisdiction among
the California courts upon such criteria as the nature of the cause of ac-
tion and the amount of the controversy. 4
Jurisdiction Over the Person or Thing
A court acquires jurisdiction over the person or thing upon the
satisfaction of three prerequisites:' 5 The first two prerequisites are
federal and are satisfied by adherence to the demands, as set out by the
United States Supreme Court, of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment;'" the third prerequisite is satisfied by compliance
with state-imposed jurisdictional statutes.' 7  The first federal prerequi-
§ 339; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 614
(1965).
12. "Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all causes except those given
by statute to other trial courts." CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10.
13. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 89 prescribes subject matter jurisdiction of municipal
courts; id. § 112 prescribes subject matter jurisdiction of justice courts. An addi-
tional subject matter limitation upon the courts of a state would exist in a case
where a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over a particular subject matter, since
the state in such a case would have no power to confer upon its courts. See 1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 38, at 310 (1954).
14. See generally 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 70.
15. See 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 53, at 324-25 (1954).
16. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS ch. 3, Introductory Note, comments
a & b at 125-26. Note that prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, jurisdic-
tion of the state courts was solely a matter of state law. "During the same period
[prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment], however, it occasionally was
intimated, if not held, by some of the state courts, that a personal judgment effective
within the territory of the state could be rendered against a non-resident defendant
who did not appear and submit himself to the jurisdiction, provided notice of the suit
had been served upon him in the state of his residence, or had been published in the
state within which the court was situated, pursuant to the provisions of a local stat-
ute. . . . As was said by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732, it is difficult to see how such a judgment could legitimately
have force even within the State. But until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
(1868) this remained a question of state law; the effect of the 'due process' clause of
the Amendment being, as was held in the case just mentioned, to establish it as the
law for all the States that a judgment rendered against a non-resident who had neither
been served with process nor appeared in the suit was devoid of validity within as well
as without the territory of the State whose court had rendered it, and to make the asser-
tion of its invalidity a matter of federal right." Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242
U.S. 394, 402-03 (1917).
17. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 92, comment j at 339-40; RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 8 (1942); see text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
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site 8 requires some relationship between the state and the person or
thing that makes the exercise of jurisdiction by the state reasonable.' 9
The second federal. prerequisite requires that adequate notice, provid-
ing an opportunity to be heard, be given a person, or persons, with possi-
ble legal interests in the thing, who might be affected by the judg-
ment.20
Efforts by the state legislature to transform the two federal pre-
requisites into easily understandable terms and procedures have re-
sulted in the embodiment of the federal prerequisites into some of the
state jurisdictional statutes. Thus, satisfaction of the third prerequi-
site, through compliance with the state jurisdictional statutes, will
generally satisfy the two federal prerequisites. 2' Of course, state stat-
utes purporting to provide for the acquisition of jurisdiction on stand-
ards less stringent than the federal requirements would be held un-
constitutional.22 On the other hand, the legislature is free to impose
more extensive requirements; 3 accordingly, some California jurisdic-
tional statutes, as interpreted by the California courts, have imposed
standards that are more stringent than the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires. The extent to which these require-
ments have limited the ability of a California court to acquire jurisdic-
tion is a major concern of this article.
Bases of Jurisdiction
Classically, the presence of the person or thing within the terri-
tory of the state, in the absence of consent or voluntary appearance,24
was the only relationship on which a state could base its jurisdiction.25
18. This prerequisite shall be referred to hereinafter as a "basis of jurisdiction,"
following the terminology used in CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1,
1970); see note 5 supra.
19. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 24, 56; RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 14, 32-33 (1942); see text accompanying notes 24-30 infra.
20. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS H8 25, 57, 69; RESTATEMENT OF
JuDGMENTS § 6 (1942); see text accompanying notes 31-42 infra.
21. The bases of jurisdiction are discussed in the text accompanying notes 24-30
infra; the requirement of adequate notice is discussed in the text accompanying notes
31-42 infra. A comprehensive discussion distinguishing these two federal due process
requirements is found in Horowitz, supra note 3, at 341-42 n.6.
22. See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (despite actual receipt of
notice by defendant, judgment against him held invalid since statute failed to provide
a reasonable means of giving defendant notice); Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., 242 F.
543 (S.D. Cal. 1917) (service upon state official not charged with duty to notify cor-
poration did not satisfy federal due process requirements).
23. See Note, Suing Foreign Corporations in California, 5 STAN. L. Rv. 503,
503-04 (1953).
24. See text accompanying notes 46-56 infra.
25. See generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 14, 32 (1942); 1 J. BEALE, A
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While this relationship continues to be a sound basis of jurisdiction, it
is presently supplemented by other possible bases. For example, the
ownership, use or possession of property within a state may be a re-
lationship sufficient to give the state a basis of jurisdiction for causes of
action arising from the defendant's ownership, use, or possession of prop-
erty.26 Other examples of possible bases of jurisdiction are residence in
the state,27 doing an act in a state,28 and doing an act outside a state
which causes an effect within the state.29  Although the above bases of
jurisdiction may satisfy the requirements of the United States Constitu-
tion, restrictive requirements in state jurisdictional statutes may circum-
scribe an area somewhere within the bounds of due process beyond
which a court may not exercise the otherwise constitutional power of
the state.30
Adequate Notice
Adequate notice, providing an opportunity to be heard, is that
notice which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.' It is usually best given
by personal service on the persons interested in the litigation, whether
it is a proceeding in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.3 2  In actions
against persons, personal service within the state satisfies both the basis
of jurisdiction requirement and the notice requirement "at one stroke. 33
Personal service outside the state usually fulfills the notice requirement,
34
but if a basis of jurisdiction is lacking36 or if there is a failure to comply
with a state jurisdictional statute,36 a judgment rendered may be sub-
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 339-43, 435-36 (1935); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 61, at 329-30 (1954).
26. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 38, 51.
27. Id. § 30.
28. Id. §§ 36, 49.
29. Id. §§ 37, 50.
30. See, e.g., Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417
(effective until July 1, 1970), which limits the court's power to render an in personam
judgment based on service of process by publication to absent residents only if they are
personally served outside the state. See note 2 supra.
31. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
32. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 25, comment d at 139.
33. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 613 (1965).
34. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 25. However, the Supreme
Court has held that where a statute did not provide for personal service of a party, a
state court lacked jurisdiction over a defendant even though he had received actual
notice of the trial. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); see Second RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS § 25, comment f at 140; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6,
comment d at 38 (1942).
35. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
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ject to collateral attack. 7  In in rem and quasi in rem actions, service
by publication and mailing of notice has long been recognized as an
adequate method of giving notice when service within the state is not
possible. 8 Under exceptional circumstances, such service may also
be adequate in actions against persons.3 9
Where a statute provides for substituted service by delivery of
process to a person other than the defendant, the adequate notice re-
quirement is satisfied if the provisions of the statute are reasonably cal-
culated to give the defendant notice40 and there has been strict com-
pliance with the statute.41 A statute providing for substituted service on
a public officer must also provide some reasonable manner of attempting
to give notice to the defendant.42
State Statutory Jurisdictional Requirements
In the absence of a state statute, a California court has the authority
to use any suitable means to effectuate its jurisdiction.4 It would be
erroneous, however, to presume that a statute is never necessary. For
instance, a court in a state without some type of "long-arm" statute
would doubtless be held incapable of rendering a judgment over an in-
dividual served with process outside the state.44 Even in the ordinary
case, where an individual is served with process within the state, statutes
perform a useful service by converting the frequently vague constitu-
tional prerequisites into specific tests and procedures on which the
plaintiff, defendant, and court may rely. 5
37. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 104-05; RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 4-8, 11-13 (1942).
38. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment g at 40 (1942).
39. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15
(1950); SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 25, comment d at 139.
40. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 16, comment b at 84 (1942).
41. See, e.g., Weisfeld v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 2d 148, 151, 242 P.2d
29, 32 (1952).
42. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Knapp v. Bullock Tractor
Co., 242 F. 543 (S.D. Cal. 1917).
43. CA.. CoDE CIV. PROC. § 187: "When jurisdiction is, by the constitution or
this code, or by any other statute, conferred upon a court or judicfal officer, all the
means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this juris-
diction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the
statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear
most conformable to the spirit of this code." See Eureka Lake & Yuba Canal Co. v.
Superior Court, 116 U.S. 410 (1886); McKendrick v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 165
Cal. 24, 29, 130 P. 865, 868 (1913); see note 194 infra.
44. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 909, 998-1008 (1960).
45. See id. at 1014-17.
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Waiver of Jurisdictional Prerequisites
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be conferred on a court
within a state only by the state's constitution or statutes,46 and cannot
be waived by concurrence of the parties to a suit.4 7  On the other hand,
the prerequisites for acquiring jurisdiction over a person48 may be
waived by that person in numerous ways. Actual consent by words,49
conduct,50 or contract 5' may be expressed, before or after an action is
commenced, 52 so as to waive one or all of the prerequisites. 3  Bringing
an action in the state acts as a waiver, and the plaintiff becomes vulner-
able to any counterclaim or crosscomplaint that a defendant may bring
against him under the local law of the state;5 4 making a general ap-
pearance, however, subjects the defendant only to causes of action
"pleaded in the original complaint, including any ancillary procedings
incidental thereto." 55  An acknowledgment of proper service has been
construed as a waiver of compliance with the statutory service of process
requirement. 56
Scope of This Article
The brief discussion of jurisdiction above provides the basis for
delimiting the scope of this article. Jurisdiction over the person, not
over the thing, is the primary concern of this article; 7 thus in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction are discussed only as they indirectly relate to
in personam jurisdiction. Further, this article will not deal with the
46. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
47. See, e.g., Summers v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298, 347 P.2d 668, 670,
1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326 (1959) (dictum); Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 188,
228 P. 15, 16 (1924). "Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be given, enlarged or
waived by the parties. . . . However, if the court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the rule is otherwise, and a party may voluntarily submit himself to the juris-
diction of the court ...... Id. at 188, 228 P. at 16 (dictum); see SECOND RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS § 32, comment b at 165; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7, com-
ment d at 45 (1942).
48. See text accompanying notes 15-45 supra.
49. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 32, comment a at 164.
50. Id.
51. See National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Frey
& Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 401, 55 P.2d 203 (1936).
52. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 32, comments d & e at 168-69.
53. "To be effective, the consent must be given by a person who is under no
legal incapacity, and jurisdiction must be exercised in strict conformity with the
terms of the consent." Id. § 32, comment a at 164.
54. Id. § 34.
55. 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 75; see RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 5, comment g at 28 (1942).
56. See Smith v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 101 Cal. App. 492, 281 P. 1049
(1929).
57. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
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subject matter jurisdiction of the California courts.5 8 An attempt is
made to focus the discussion on the extent to which California's legis-
lature and judiciary, by the enactment and interpretation of statutory
jurisdictional requirements,59 have eliminated some bases on which a
California court might otherwise exercise jurisdiction within the limits
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.60
Since the purpose of this article is to afford the reader an appre-
ciation of the significance of the new basis of jurisdiction statute,61
the relationship between the California statutory jurisdictional require-
ments6 2 and the federal constitutional requirement of adequate notice
63
is not discussed. Although jurisdiction over the person acquired by
some forms of waiver64 might properly be classified as additional bases
of jurisdiction,68 they are not bases limited by the statutory require-
ments under discussion and therefore are not within the scope of this
article.
In summary, the scope of the discussion to follow includes a his-
torical review of the development of the limiting effects of California's
statutory jurisdictional requirements upon otherwise consitutional bases
of in personam jurisdiction.6
California's Basic Jurisdictional Statutes
The basic provisions for the service of process, 67 performing the
58. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 21-23, 43-45 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 18-19, 24-30 supra. The commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution has also been relied upon in the past, to a limited extent,
to disapprove the acquisition of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Farmers Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). A discussion of its im-
portance, however, is without the scope of this article. For a brief discussion of
the historical impact of the commerce clause on state-court jurisdiction, and its potential
use in limiting the ever-expanding jurisdictional facet of due process, see Developments
in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960).
61. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970); see note 5 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 21-23, 43-45 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 20, 31-42 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
65. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLicTs §§ 32-35, 45-46.
66. See generally Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and
Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rtv. 198 (1958); Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal Service
Outside the State: Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41 CALiI. L. REv. 383 (1953);
Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to Render Judgments Against
Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1958);
Comment, State Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 11 HASTIngs L.J. 460 (1960);
Comment, Suing Foreign Corporations in California, 5 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1953).
67. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 411 (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 346, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
§ 412 (effective until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL.
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dual function noted above,6 8 have retained a format similar to the pro-
visions enacted by the first session of the California legislature in 1850.69
The 1850 provisions were replaced by essentially similar provisions in
185170 when section 26 of the 1850 act was superseded by section 29 of
the California Practice Act;7 and section 27 of the 1850 act was super-
seded by sections 30 and 31 of the California Practice Act.
7 2
CODE CIV. PROC. § 413 (effective until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at
3052, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 417 (effective until July 1, 1970); see note 2 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
69. Cal. Stat. 1849-50, ch. 142, §§ 26, 27, at 430: "§ 26. The summons shall
be served by the sheriff of the county where the defendant may be found, and shall
be served by delivering a copy thereof, together with the copy of the complaint as
follows:
"1st. If the suit be against a corporation, to the president, or other head of the
corporation, secretary, cashier, or managing agent thereof.
"4th. In all other cases to the defendant personally. [The portions omitted per-
tain to minors and guardians of incompetents.]
"§ 27. When the person on whom service is to be made, cannot after due diligence
be found within the State, and that fact shall be shown by the Sheriff's return upon the
summons, and also be proved by affidavit to the satisfaction of the Court, or that he
is a non-resident of the State, and it shall appear by affidavit that a cause of action
exists against the defendant, in respect to whom the service is to be made, or that he is
a necessary or proper party to any action, the Court or Judge may grant an order that
the same be made by publication of summons. The order shall direct the publication to
be made in some one or more newspapers . . . . In the case of publication the
Court or Judge shall also direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited in the post-office, directed to the person to be served at his place of residence,
unless it appears by affidavit that such residence is neither known to the party making
the application, nor can with reasonable diligence be ascertained by him. If the sum-
mons shall not be personally served on a defendant, he or his representatives shall
(except in actions for divorce) be allowed to defend after judgment, or at any time
within one year after notice thereof, and within three years after its rendition, on such
terms as be just. . . . When the defendant is out of the State, the publication shall be
once a month, for not less than six months."
For a discussion of the background and basis of the 1850 Act, see Blume, Adop-
tion in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A Chapter in American Legal
History, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 701 (1966).
70. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, §§ 29-31, at 55. For a discussion of the influence of
the Field Code of Civil Procedure on the 1851 Act, see Blume, supra note 69.
71. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 29, at 55: "§ 29. The Summons shall be served by
delivering a copy thereof attached to the certified copy of the complaint, as follows:
"Ist. If the suit be against a corporation, to the president or other head of the cor-
poration, secretary, cashier, or managing agent thereof.
"4th. In all other cases, to the defendant personally." [The portions omitted per-
tain to minors and to guardians of incompetents.]
72. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, §§ 30-31, at 55: "§ 30. When the person on whom
the service is to be made, resides out of the State, or has departed from the State; or
cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State; or conceals himself to avoid the
service of summons, and the fact shall appear by affidavit to the satisfaction of the
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Section 411 and Its Statutory Predecessors
Section 29 of the Practice Act, the statutory predecessor to Code
of Civil Procedure section 41 1 ,7' provided for service within the state
by delivery to specific officers and agents of corporations, 74 to repre-
sentatives of special classes of individuals, 75 and to the defendant
personally "in all other cases."176 "In all other cases" covers the ordinary
case of service upon an individual defendant within the state.
Service on an individual within the state, the classic "territorial
theory" of jurisdiction, has raised no serious basis-of-jurisdiction ques-
tions. 77  Whether the individual served was a resident or nonresident,
on business or just casually passing through, was not important so
long as he was within the state when served.
78
In contrast to individuals, there has been considerable litigation
under section 411 centering upon the problem of acquiring jurisdiction
over a corporation with agents in California. Where corporations are
Court or Judge thereof, or a county Judge, and it shall in like manner appear, that a
cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be
made, or that he is a necessary or proper party to the action, such Court or Judge
may grant an order that the service be made by the publication of the summons.
"§ 31. The order shall direct the publication to be made in a newspaper to be desig-
nated, as most likely to give notice to the person to be served, and for such length of
time as may be deemed reasonable, at least once a week: Provided, that publication
against a defendant residing out of the State, or absent therefrom, shall not be less
than three months. In case of publication where the residence of a non-resident or
absent defendant is known, the Court or Judge shall also direct a copy of the summons
and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the Post office, directed to the person
to be served, at his place of residence. When publication is ordered, personal service
of a copy of the summons and complaint, out of the State, shall be equivalent to publi-
cation and deposit in the Post office. In either case, the service of the summons
shall be deemed complete at the expiration of the time prescribed by the order for pub-
lication. In actions upon contracts for the direct payment of money, the Court in
its discretion may, instead of ordering publication, or may after publication, appoint
an Attorney to appear for the non-resident, absent, or concealed defendant, and con-
duct the proceedings on his part."
Section 30 was partially influenced by the civil law. See Ehrenzweig & Mills,
Personal Service Outside the State: Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41 CAL F. L. R-v.
383, 384 n.111 (1953).
73. See note 2 supra.
74. See note 71 supra.
75. These classes concerned minors under the age of 14 and persons judicially
declared to be of unsound mind, or incapable of conducting their own affairs.
76. See note 71 supra.
77. See generally 1 B. WrrxN, CAriORN PRocEDuRE Jurisdiction § 61, at
329-30 (1954).
78. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). In the case of
Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), jurisdiction was upheld where
service was made upon the defendant in a plane passing over the state.
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concerned, it becomes relevant whether the corporation is a "resident"
or "nonresident, ' ' "° and whether the agent served with process is in the
state casually or on business.80  Also in contrast are the amendments to
section 411 and section 29 of the Practice Act and the supplementary
statutes, which, as they have been interpreted by the judiciary, have
been generally responsible for the expansion of the bases on which
California courts could exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
For example, an 1861 amendment 8l to section 29 required that a foreign
corporation be "doing business" within the state before its agents could
be served with process;8 2 under this statute the California judiciary has
been able to extend California's bases of jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations to the full extent permitted by the Federal Constitution.
8 3
Other statutes, enacted independently of section 411, but later
incorporated into that section by reference, have also served to broaden
the bases on which foreign corporations could be subjected to in per-
sonam jurisdiction in California courts.8 4  These statutes first required
foreign corporations transacting business within the state to appoint
agents for service of process;8 5 later statutes provided for substituted
service on an officer of the state where agents had not been appointed
or could not be found within the state.
86
Sections 412 and 413 and Their Statutory Predecessors
Sections 30 and 31 of the Practice Act,87 the statutory predeces-
sors of sections 412 and 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 8 provided
for service of process by publication. Section 30, the predecessor of
section 412, provided for such service pursuant to a court order where
a potential defendant or necessary party was outside the state or could
not be found within the state.8 9 Section 31, the predecessor of section
413, set out the requirements for a valid service by publication, and
79. See text accompanying notes 165-78 infra.
80. See Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., 242 F. 543 (S.D. Cal. 1917).
81. Cal. Stat. 1861, ch. 432, § 1, at 496.
82. See text accompanying notes 165-75 infra.
83. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958).
84. See text accompanying notes 179-92 infra.
85. Cal. Stat. 1871-72, ch. 566, §§ 1-3, at 826; Cal. Stat. 1869-70, ch. 578,
H§ 1-5, at 881. See also Cal. Pol. Code § 616 (1872) (requirements similar to Cal.
Stat. 1869-70, ch. 578, § 1, at 881, applicable to insurance companies).
86. Cal. Stat. 1899, ch. 94, §§ 1-4, at 111, amending Cal. Stat. 1871-72, ch. 566,
§§ 1-3, at 826 (providing for substituted service on Secretary of State). See also
Cal. Code Amnds. 1877-78, ch. 604, § 6, at 17, amending Cal. Pol. Code § 616
(1872) (providing for substituted service on Insurance Commissioner).
87. See note 72 supra.
88. See note 2 supra.
89. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 30, at 55.
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further provided that personal service outside the state pursuant to the
court order would be equivalent to actual publication and mailing of
notice.90 The Act originally spoke only of the "person!' on whom
service was to be made,9" but an 1854 case 2 and subsequent legisla-
tion9" made it clear that the provisions applied both to individuals and
corporations.
Litigation involving the attempted acquisition of in personam juris-
diction under these sections has been primarily limited to cases involving
individuals. The scarcity of litigation involving the acquisition of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over corporations under sections 412 and 413 seems
to reflect the adequacy of the provisions applicable to corporations under
section 411 and the supporting statutes above noted.94 In contrast,
service of process on the defendant personally within the state, the
only basis on which section 411 will allow the acquisition of jurisdic-
tion over an individual, has not been completely satisfactory as a means
of acquiring jurisdiction over individuals in this modem age; thus,
sections 412 and 413 have received much more attention from parties
seeking to sue individuals than from parties seeking to sue corpora-
tions.
Bases of Jurisdiction and the Service of Process Provisions:
A California History
As indicated above, controversy over the bases of jurisdiction
covering individuals has centered around sections 412 and 413, and
the same controversy in the case of corporations has centered around
section 411. The discussion that follows attempts to analyze the bases
supporting the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over individuals
under sections 412 and 413, and under California's nonresident motor-
ist statute,9 5 up to the time the Supreme Court decided Milliken v.
Meyer98 in 1940. This is followed by a similar discussion concerning
corporations under section 411, up to the time the Supreme Court de-
cided International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 7 in 1945. Each of
these Supreme Court cases represents a turning point for California:
Milliken inspired legislative action98 in regard to sections 412 and 413,
and International Shoe served as a basis for judicial legislation in re-
90. Id.
91. See note 72 supra.
92. Douglas v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 304, 306 (1854).
93. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 64, § 1, at 69; Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 693, § 1, at 1422.
94. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra & 179-206, 223-27 infra.
95. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 27, § 404, at 154, as amended, CAL. VMu. CODE § 17451.
96. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
97. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
98. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 935, § 1, at 2537, as amended, CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc.
§ 417 (effective until July 1, 1970).
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gard to the meaning of the "doing business" provision in section 411.19
The period from Milliken and International Shoe to the present time is
then discussed in two consecutive sections, again showing the develop-
ment of the bases for acquiring jurisdiction over individuals and cor-
porations separately. In the conclusion the diverse results obtained
from these separate lines of development are contrasted, and the proba-
ble eradication of these differences by the new law is discussed.
Individuals: Statehood to Milliken v. Meyer, 1850 to 1940
Sections 30 and 31 of the Practice Act,' enacted in 1851, au-
thorized a court to acquire personal jurisdiction over an absent resident
or nonresident by publication. 1 1 A judgment obtained where there
was such publication, however, could be enforced only against the de-
fendant's property in California,0 2 and was not entitled to be enforced
in any other state, under the full faith and credit clause.
A personal judgment rendered in California could be enforced
in other states only if the defendant was personally served within
California."' Nonetheless, because service by publication could, in
fact, support a personal judgment against an absent resident or non-
resident, enforceable in California, the potential for abuse was great.104
99. See Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958).
100. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, §§ 30-31, at 55.
101. See Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350, 369 (1874) (dictum); Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal.
391,403 (1868); see note 186 infra.
102. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730-31 (1878); Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449,
455 (1857). "[Courts have no right, when actual legal notice is not given, to assume
jurisdiction to render a decree, which shall create personal obligations on a defendant
who does not owe allegiance to the state, or who is not domiciled within its terri-
tory. Whatever effect the local law may give to such judgments, they will, beyond
the territorial limits of that law, be regarded as nullities." Note, 8 WESTERN L.. 365,
366 (1851). See generally Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal Service Outside the State:
Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41 CALIF. L. RaV. 383, 386-87 (1953).
103. See Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449, 455 (1857), in which a New York action was
held not to be personally binding on a California defendant, where publication in
New York was the only means used to notify defendant of the proceeding. See Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730-31 (1878).
104. As a result of this potential abuse, the courts interpreted literally the broad
statutory language of the statute, without making any presumption of jurisdiction.
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350 (1873); Forbes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342, 357 (1866); Mc-
Minn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300 (1865); Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal. 149, 151
(1864); Jordan v. Giblin, 12 Cal. 100 (1859). See also Ehrenzweig & Mills, Per-
sonal Service Outside the State: Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 383
(1953), where the authors feel that another reason for the court's strict interpretation
was "[tlhe less dependable conditions of the mails of that day and also by a general
inclination to interpret narrowly statutes in derogation of the common law." id. at
385-86.
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Prior to the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff1 5 in 1878, therefore,
the apparent concern of both the California courts and the legislature
was to provide a defendant susceptible to service by publication some
measure of protection.' 0
The California Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1872, re-
placed sections 30 and 31 of the Practice Act with substantially identi-
cal sections, numbered 412 and 413.107 The new Code, however,
eliminated one of the judiciary's primary justifications for its reluc-
The last provision of section 31 provided: "In actions upon contracts . . . the
Court . . . may . . . appoint an Attorney to appear for the non-resident, absent, or
concealed defendant ... ." This provision was upheld as constitutional in Ware v.
Robinson, 9 Cal. 107 (1858) (defendant concealed within the state). In Jordan v.
Giblin, 12 Cal. 100 (1859), the court held the appointment of an attorney invalid for
an absent resident, on the ground that the affidavit for publication was insufficient.
This exemplifies the restrictive approach the courts took in applying this section.
105. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
106. Jordan v. Giblin, 12 Cal. 100 (1859) (literal observance of the statute re-
quired so as not to encourage fraud and lead to oppression). See Ricketson v. Rich-
ardson, 26 Cal. 149 (1864), where the court stated that strict compliance with the
statute was required; "otherwise its provisions may lead to gross abuse, and the rights
of person and property made to depend upon the elastic consciences of interested
parties, rather than the enlightened judgment of a Court or Judge." Id. at 154. The
legislature was so concerned with fraud that it authorized defendants to reopen suits
within six months where judgments were entered pursuant to sections 30 and 31.
Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 68, at 60.
107. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 412 (1872). Section 412 originally read: "Where
the person on whom the service is to be made resides out of the State, or has de-
parted from the State, or cannot after due diligence, be found within the State, or
conceals himself to avoid the service of summons, or is a foreign corporation having
no managing or business agent, Cashier, or Secretary within the State, and the fact
appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the Court, or a Judge thereof, or a County
Judge, and it also appears by such affidavit, or by the verified complaint on file, that
a cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be
made, or that he is a necessary or proper party to the action, such Court or Judge
may make an order that the service be made by publication of the summons." Id.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 413 (1872) read: "The order must direct the publication
to be made in a newspaper to be designated, as most likely to give notice to the per-
son to be served, and for such length of time as may be deemed reasonable, at least
once a week; but publication against a defendant residing out of the State, or absent
therefrom, must not be less than two months. In the case of publication, where the
residence of a non-resident, or absent defendant is known, the Court or Judge must
direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the Post
Office, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence. When publica-
tion is ordered, personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint, out of
State, is equivalent to publication and deposit in the Post Office. In either case, the
service of the summons is complete at the expiration of the time prescribed by the
order for publication. In actions upon contracts for the direct payment of money, the
Court in its discretion may, instead of ordering publication, or may after publication,
appoint an attorney to appear for the non-resident, absent, or concealed defendant,
and conduct the proceedings on his part." For a comparison to sections 30 and 31 of
the Practice Act, see note 72 supra.
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tance to apply sections 30 and 31 of the Practice Act-namely, the gen-
eral rule that statutes deviating from the common law were to be strictly
construed, 10 8 which was repudiated by sections 4109 and 187110 of the
new Code. In other words, while the courts were required to construe
sections 30 and 31 of the Practice Act strictly, they were conversely re-
quired to construe the new sections 412 and 413 liberally.' Notwith-
standing the above statutory change, however, the judicial insistence
upon exact compliance with the provisions of sections 30 and 31 did
not change with the adoption of sections 412 and 413 of the new
Code.
112
In 1872, the legislature adopted a "Register of Absent Defend-
ants," which was designed to minimize the possibility of fraud upon an
absent defendant." 3  The act provided that in actions against nonresi-
dents, the plaintiff must file a copy of the publication with the Secre-
tary of State."' The register was open to the public for inspection at
all times. Because the act was repealed in 1874,11 only two years
after its creation, and because no cases were litigated under it, an evalua-
tion is impossible.
California's publication provisions were limited further when the
legislature, in 1874, deleted the last sentence of section 413.116 This
108. Forbes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342, 357 (1866); Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal.
149, 152 (1864). Strict construction of the statute was especially true regarding the
required affidavits. Braly v. Seaman, 30 Cal. 610, 617 (1866); Jordan v. Giblin, 12
Cal. 100, 102 (1859); Grewell v. Henderson, 5 Cal. 465 (1855). More recent cases
have cited with approval the rule that statutes which deviate from the common law
are to be strictly construed. E.g., Columbia Screw Co. v. Warner Lock Co., 138 Cal.
445, 446, 71 P. 498 (1903); McPhail v. Nunes, 38 Cal. App. 557, 560, 177 P. 193, 194
(1918); Lima v. Lima, 26 Cal. App. 1, 6, 147 P. 233, 234 (1914).
109. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 4: "The rule of the common law, that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The
Code establishes the law of this state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its
provisions and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed, with a view to
effect its objects and to promote justice."
A New York court in Jackson v. Wiseburn, 10 N.Y.C.L.R. 799 (1830), while dis-
cussing a provision specifying within what time an act must be done, commented about
rules in derogation of the common law: "The rules and practice of the court being estab-
lished by the court, may be made to yield to circumstances, to promote the ends of
justice. Not so as to a statute; it is unbending, requiring implicit obedience as well
from the court as from its suitors." The New York publication statute was similar to
California's.
110. See note 43 supra.
111. See note 109 supra.
112. Livermore v. Ratti, 150 Cal. 458, 465, 89 P. 327, 328 (1907); Gambert v.
Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 544 (1872).
113. Cal. Stat. 1872, ch. 290, § 3, at 392.
114. Id. § 1, at 392.
115. Cal. Stat. 1873-74, ch. 338, § 1, at 495.
116. Cal. Code Amnds. 1873-74, ch. 383, § 50, at 299, amending Cal. Stat. 1871-
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sentence, which was also the last sentence of section 31 of the Practice
Act, permitted the court to appoint an attorney for the absent defend-
ant instead of ordering publication. 117 Considerable litigation centered
on this sentence prior to its deletion.118 In the same session, the legis-
lature extended from six months to one year the time allowed under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473 within which a defendant could
come in and defend on the merits a decision resting upon service by
publication. 1" 9 It was a famous United States Supreme Court decision,
however, which led to the most significant changes in favor of such
defendants.
Pennoyer v. Neff: The End of an Era
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 20 the Supreme Court was asked to determine
the validity of a personal judgment rendered in 1866 by an Oregon
court against a nonresident of Oregon. Jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent had been originally obtained pursuant to an Oregon statute which,
like California's Code of Civil Procedure sections 412 and 413, au-
thorized service of process by publication on an absent nonresident
defendant.'' The Court held that a personal judgment so obtained was
void and unenforceable even in Oregon, the state in which it had been
rendered.' 22  The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 123
although adopted after the Oregon judgment had been rendered, was
held to constitute a ground on which the validity of such judgments
could always be questioned. 24  Where the subject matter of the suit
involved a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, the
Court viewed due process of law as requiring "service of process [upon
the defendant] within the State, or his voluntary appearance.' 2 5 Thus,
the validity of a judgment, even in the rendering state, was subject to
attack in the absence of compliance with this strict "territorial theory"
of jurisdiction.
72, ch. 171, § 1, at 190.
117. See note 107 supra.
118. E.g., Ware v. Robinson, 9 Cal. 107 (1858); Anderson v. Parker, 6 Cal. 201
(1856).
119. Cal. Code Amnds. 1873-74, ch. 383, § 60, at 302: "When, from any cause,
the summons in an action has not been personally served on the defendant, the Court
may allow, on such terms as may be just, such defendant, or his legal representative, at
any time within one year after the rendition of any judgment in such action, to-answer
to the merits of the original action." The above amendment was enacted at the same
time the last sentence of section 413 was deleted.
120. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
121. Id. at 738.
122. Id. at 733.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
124. 95 U.S. at 733.
125. Id.
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The Court in Pennoyer rejected the assumption made by many
courts'26 that where a nonresident had property within the forum state,
it was immaterial in determining the court's jurisdiction whether the
property was brought under the control of the court by attachment at,
or subsequent to, the commencement of the action. The practice of
seizing a nonresident's property only after the absent nonresident's lia-
bility had been established in a personal action based on service by
publication, was commented upon by the Court as follows:
[The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and determine his
obligations at all is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the prop-
erty. Its jurisdiction in that respect cannot be made to depend
upon facts to be ascertained after it had tried the cause and ren-
dered the judgment. If the judgment be previously void, it will
not become valid by the subsequent discovery of property of the
defendant, or by his subsequent acquisition of it.'
27
On the basis of the above reasoning, the Court limited the range of
possible actions against an absent nonresident to those that were essen-
tially in rem. By requiring the attachment of the defendant's property
at the commencement of the action, the Court emphasized that the
property of the absent nonresident was the only basis of the court's
jurisdiction. This aspect of the Pennoyer decision terminated the es-
tablished California practice of rendering personal judgments against a
nonresident owning property in the state without either serving him
personally within the state or attaching his property at the commence-
ment of the action.
128
The Effect of Pennoyer v. Neff in California
Two years after the Pennoyer decision, it was followed by the
California Supreme Court in Belcher v. Chambers, 29 in which the
Court held that jurisdiction could not be acquired by publication where
126. E.g., Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391 (1868).
127. 95 U.S. at 728.
128. See De ]a Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 121-22, 44 P. 345,
350 (1896) (dissenting opinion). See 1 PAc. COAST L.J. 21 (1878), where the author
comments that the Pennoyer case "[will prove to be all important as it seems to be a
death stroke to the system of rendering personal judgments against non-residents upon
default after publication .... ." Id. at 23.
Pennoyer did not clarify whether its decision applied only to nonresidents, or
whether it extended to absent residents as well. This caused many states, including
California, to interpret Pennoyer as requiring personal service within the state in all
personal actions. See Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and
Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 198 (1958). "Because of this vagueness ...
many . . . state courts . . . interpreted the case as holding that due process required
the traditional means of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant in all in personam
actions." Id. at 199.
129. 53 Cal. 635 (1879). This case specifically overruled Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal.
391 (1868). See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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the nonresident's property was not attached at the commencement of
the action.130  Later, in Anderson v. Goff,131 the court upheld a judg-
ment in which service was made upon a nonresident defendant by pub-
lication pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 412 and 413. The
action was on a note, and property of the defendant was attached at the
commencement of the action. The court recognized that a judgment on
the note would be void as an in personam judgment, but stated that
"where the debtor has property within the state, which is seized under
a writ of attachment. . . a judgment therein. . . is so far in the nature
of a proceeding in rem, as to uphold a sale of the attached property...
and to that extent is not void."'
1 32
Subsequent to the Anderson v. Goff decision, in an apparent effort
to reconcile the wording of section 412 with the requirements of Pen-
noyer, the legislature amended the section and thus made it expressly
applicable to actions involving real or personal property in which the
defendant had an interest.1 3
De la Montanya v. De la Montanya: Applying
Pennoyer to Absent Domiciliaries
In De la Montanya v. De la Montanya,3 4 the California Supreme
Court refused to limit the "territorial theory" of jurisdiction enunciated
in Pennoyer v. Neff, to a nonresident defendant. De la Montanya in-
volved a divorce proceeding wherein the plaintiff, in addition to a di-
vorce, sought to obtain alimony. The defendant was both a resi-
dent and domiciliary when the cause of action arose, but left the
state before the suit was commenced. The defendant retained his
status as a California domiciliary, however, until after constructive serv-
ice of process by publication and mailing had been made. The Supreme
Court of California held that although the state had jurisdiction to
grant the divorce, it had no jurisdiction to render in personam alimony
judgments against persons "not within its territory, and. . . to allow it
to summon one from another state is an encroachment upon the inde-
pendence of such state.'
3 5
130. 53 Cal. at 640.
131. 72 Cal. 65, 13 P. 73 (1887).
132. Id. at 71-72, 13 P. at 76.
133. Cal. Stat. 1893, ch. 202, § 1, at 285: "Where the person on whom service
is to be made resides out of the State, or has departed from the State . . . and . . . a
cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be
made . . . or . . . it is an action which relates to or the subject of which is real or
personal property in this State, in which such person defendant. . . has or claims a lien
or interest. . . such Court or Judge may make an order that the service be made by the
publication of the summons."
134. 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896).
135. Id. at 112, 44 P. at 347.
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The court attached no importance to the fact that the defendant
was a resident process dodger, rather than-as in Pennoyer v. Neff-
a nonresident. The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the case as one in-
volving a domiciliary was rejected by the court on the ground that
"[d]omicile has never . . . been made the test of jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment. '136  The dissenting judges argued that California
did have jurisdiction over its domiciliaries and that the court was entitled
to enter a personal judgment against such domiciliaries, pursuant to
sections 412 and 413, even though the domiciliaries were outside the
state.' 3 7 Although decided by the marginal vote of four to three, De la
Montanya prevented, for nearly half a century, the acquisition of per-
sonal jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries.
138
Period of Stagnation: De la Montanya to the
Nonresident Motorist Statute, 1896-1935
The De la Montanya decision in 1896 marked the beginning of
a period-which was to last until 1935139-during which there were
no major changes in the jurisdictional policies or statutes affecting ab-
absent or nonresident individuals.140  Nevertheless, several court de-
cisions rendered during this period expanded the manner in which a
court's jurisdiction could attach to an absent resident or nonresident
136. Id. at 109, 44 P. at 346.
137. Id. at 119, 44 P. at 349.
138. Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 401, 404, 55 P.2d 203,
204 (1936) (dictum); Britton v. Bryson, 216 Cal. 362, 368, 14 P.2d 502, 504 (1932)
(dictum); Grinbaum v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 566, 221 P. 651 (1923); Boring v.
Penniman, 134 Cal. 514, 66 P. 739 (1901); Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 47 P. 37
(1896); Shillock v. Shillock, 24 Cal. App. 191, 140 P. 954 (1914); Merchants Nat'l
Union v. Buisseret, 15 Cal. App. 444, 115 P. 58 (1911). For child custody cases
adhering to De la Montanya, see Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 29 P.2d 206
(1934); In re Chandler, 36 Cal. App. 2d 583, 97 P.2d 1048 (1940).
De la Montanya was followed in California until 1951, when the legislature en-
acted Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 935, § 1, at 2537, as amended Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674,
§ 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417 (effective until July 1, 1970). This was true
even though Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), was decided in 1940. See Pinon
v. Pollard, 69 Cal. App. 2d 129, 132, 158 P.2d 254, 256 (1945).
139. The California nonresident motorist statute was passed in 1935. See text
accompanying notes 145-59 infra.
140. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 412 (1872) was amended by the following enact-
ments: Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 142, § 1, at 141; Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 64, § 1, at 69; Cal.
Stat. 1913, ch. 693, § 1, at 1422; Cal. Stat. 1919, ch. 201, § 1, at 293; Cal. Stat. 1933,
ch. 744, § 19, at 1845; Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 42, § 1, at 64; Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1124,
§ 1, at 2025; Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1737, § 48, at 4099.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 413 (1872) was amended by the following enactments:
Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 884, § 1, at 1898; Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 20, at 1846; Cal.
Stat. 1937, ch. 548, § 1, at 1577; Cal. Stat. 1947, ch. 248, § 1, at 815; Cal. Stat. 1949,
ch. 456, § 1, at 799; Cal Stat. 1951, ch. 43, § 1, at 167; Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669,
§ 1, at 3048.
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defendant because of the defendant's own actions.
In 1909, it was held that the state acquires jurisdiction over a
defendant who appears generally in an action within the state.14' It
was further held in 1924 that by appearing generally, a competent de-
fendant dispensed with the requirement that he be served with process.'42
In 1929, a person was said to subject himself to the court's jurisdiction
by acknowledging due service of process.' 43  In addition, in 1931, a
foreign national was subjected to a California court's jurisdiction for
any counterclaim, or crosscomplaint that a defendant may bring against
him within the subject matter jurisdiction of the state.' 44
The Nonresident Motorist Statute
The increased use of automobiles as a means of interstate trans-
portation created a need for statutory regulation over nonresident mo-
torists. In 1923, California adopted a statute that required nonresi-
dents to register their vehicles within 10 days after entering the state.' 45
In some states, nonresident motorist statutes designated a state official
who was to receive the process on behalf of nonresidents involved in
accidents. Such provisions were held constitutional by the Supreme
Court in Hess v. Pawloski. 46  Eight years later, in 1935, California
adopted a similar provision, 4 7 which appears to have been molded from
141. Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 87, 103 P. 317, 318 (1909).
142. Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 189, 228 P. 15, 16 (1924); see
Raps v. Raps, 20 Cal. 2d 382, 125 P.2d 826 (1942).
143. Smith v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 101 Cal. App. 492, 281 P. 1049 (1929).
144. United States of Mexico v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21, 49, 4 P.2d 981, 993
(1931).
145. Cal. Stat. 1923, ch. 266, § 4, at 518.
146. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The first nonresident motorist statute was adopted
in New Jersey. It required that nonresidents express consent to the appointment
of an agent for service of process. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
147. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 27, § 404, at 154: "(a) The acceptance by a nonresident
of the rights and privileges conferred upon him by this code or any use of the highways
of this State as evidenced by the operation by himself or agent of a motor vehicle
upon the highways of this State or in the event such nonresident is the owner of a
motor vehicle then by the operation of such vehicle upon the highways of this State by
any person with his express or implied permission, is equivalent to an appointment
by such nonresident of the director or his successor in office to be his true and law-
ful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding
against said nonresident operator or nonresident owner growing out of any acci-
dent or collision resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle upon the highways
of this State by himself or agent.
"(b) The acceptance of such rights and privileges or use of said highways shall be
a signification of the agreement of said nonresident that any such process against him
which is served in the manner herein provided shall be of the same legal force and
validity as if served on said nonresident personally in this State."
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the Massachusetts provision 48 upheld in Hess v. Pawloski. The Cali-
fornia statute provided that any nonresident owning or driving a vehicle
in California impliedly consented to the appointment of the Director of
Motor Vehicles as his attorney. The nonresident was therefore bound
by any service of process delivered to the Director. 1 9 A copy of the
summons and complaint was to be sent by registered mail to the defend-
ant by the plaintiff. Personal service outside the state was also author-
ized. 150
The California nonresident motorist statute was first utilized in
1938. A California appellate court held personal service on a driver,
employed as an independant contractor, not to be binding on the em-
ployer corporation."' Three years later, it was held that jurisdiction
could be acquired over a minor who at the time of service was in a
foreign country. The court felt it was not the minor that delegated the
power to the Director, but the law.152 In a later case, McDonald v.
Superior Court,'"3 it was held that loading and unloading a vehicle, as
well as renting a vehicle, falls within the meaning of the term "opera-
Similar legislation granting the court personal jurisdiction over nonresident air-
craft operators was passed in 1957. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21414. As of January
1970, no cases had been litigated under the nonresident aircraft operators statute. An
interesting question has been raised, however. "What of the case of a nonresident
aircraft operator who flies into California and is involved in an accident without
having used an airport in California?" Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California
Courts To Render Judgments Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident In-
dividuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 364 n.111 (1958).
A California nonresident boatowners statute was adopted in 1963. Cal. Stat. 1963,
ch. 1280, § 1, at 2805. Its primary purpose was to combat the problems created by
the substantial increase in the number of nonresident vessels in California territorial
waters. Cal. State Bar Ass'n, Review of 1963 Code Legislation, 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 715
(1963). These problems were similar to those caused by nonresident motorists, and
nonresident aviators. It was virtually impossible to serve process on a foreign ship, or
on a boat that caused injuries and left prior to receiving service of process. In re-
sponse, the California legislature passed an act giving the courts personal jurisdiction
over nonresident boatowners. CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE §§ 600-09. A distinction be-
tween the nonresident boatowners act and its predecessors, the nonresident motorist
and aviator acts is that the nonresident boatowner must appear within 60 days. Id.
§ 608. On the other hand, if served under the motorist or aviator acts, the de-
fendant gets such continuances as the court deems proper. As of this writing, this
provision has not been tested in the California courts. See also Curry v. Fred
Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1966) (section 601 is discussed in passing).
148. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921), ch. 90, as amended, ch. 431, § 2, [1923] Mass.
Stat.
149. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 27, § 404, at 154.
150. Id. § 404(c)-(d), at 155.
151. Fuller v. Lindenbaum, 29 Cal. App. 2d 227, 84 P.2d 155 (1938).
152. Silver Swan Liquor Corp. v. Adams, 43 Cal. App. 2d 851, 110 P.2d 1097
(1941).
153. 43 Cal. 2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954).
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tion." The statute is therefore not restricted to actual physical driving
or control.5
The nonresident motorist statute was amended in 193 7 ,15r and
again in 1945156 The 1945 amendment provided that a person's
status as a resident or nonresident is to be determined at the time of the
collision or accident. 157  This was more helpful than the previous
provision which defined a "nonresident" as "a person who is not a resi-
dent of this state."'158 The statute has again been amended and re-
numbered, 59 and is now found in the California Vehicle Code, sections
17450 to 17458.
Corporations: Statehood to International Shoe, 1849 to 1945
Section 29 of the California Practice Act,160 like the 1850 service
of process statute' 61 which it superseded, expanded the common law rule
requiring service on the president or head of a corporation 6 2 by also
allowing service on the secretary, cashier, or managing agent.'6 3 These
statutes made no reference to the distinction between domestic and
foreign corporations, providing simply for service of process in suits
"against a corporation."' 64
Doing Business and the Implied Consent Theory
In 1861, a provision was added to section 29 specifying that serv-
ice on a foreign corporation "doing business within the State must be
made upon an Agent, Cashier, or Secretary thereof."'165 A few other
states, as early as 1829, had enacted similar statutes providing for the
acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing
business within the state. 66 The prevailing opinion during the earlier
154. See also Schefke v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 2d 715, 289 P.2d 542
(1955), where defendant backed into plaintiff in a private gas station; the court held
that the private property was included in the term "public highway."
155. Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 840, § 2, at 235.
156. Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 1244, § 1, at 2356.
157. Id. § l(h): "[Nonresident means a person who is not a resident of this
State at the time the accident or collision occurs."
158. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 27, § 72, at 98.
159. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 720, § 1, at 2092; Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 637, § 1, at 1134.
160. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 29, at 55; see note 71 supra.
161. Cal. Stat. 1849-50, ch. 142, § 26, at 430; see note 69 supra.
162. See SECOND RESrATEMENT OF CoNFLIcTs § 41, comment c at 212.
163. See Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5, § 29(1), at 55; Cal. Stat. 1849-50, ch. 142, § 26
(1), at 430.
164. See notes 69 & 71 supra.
165. Cal. Stat. 1861, ch. 432, § 1, at 496.
166. See generally 1 J. BEALE, A TRMATISE ON H CONFLicT OF LAWS 370 (1935).
"In the earlier part of the nineteenth century... [tihere was held to be no method
of acquiring jurisdiction to render personal judgment against a foreign corporation ....
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part of the nineteenth century, however, was that in the absence of con-
sent or voluntary appearance, a corporation could not be sued outside
the state of its incorporation. 6 ' Then, in 1856, the Supreme Court,
in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,16 8 sanctioned a fictional means
of finding consent to be sued in another state. The Court held valid
an Ohio statute that provided that a foreign corporation, by putting
an agent in the state to transact business, has "impliedly consented" to
service of process on that agent. The Court reasoned:
A corporation created by Indiana can contract business in
Ohio only with the consent ...of the latter State . . . .This
consent may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may
think fit to impose; and these conditions must be deemed valid
and effectual by other States . . .provided they are not repugnant
to the constitution or laws of the United States ....
Now, when this corporation sent its agent into Ohio, with
authority to make contracts of insurance there, the corporation
must be taken to assent to the condition upon which alone such
business could be there transacted by them; that condition being,
that an agent, to make contracts, should also be the agent of the
corporation to receive service of process in suits on such contracts
169
Although the Court explained that its opinion should be confined to
the facts of this case, the theory of "implied consent" did provide ra-
tional support for the abovementioned "doing business" statutes.17
Perhaps Lafayette, by lending an air of respectability to the "doing
business" statutes and by indirectly calling attention to California's lack
of such a statute, influenced the original adoption of the California
"doing business" provision in 186 1.171
The "implied consent" theory of suing foreign corporations con-
However, State legislatures began as early as 1829 to pass statutes providing for pro-
ceedings in personam against foreign corporations . . . . provided the foreign cor-
poration was doing business within the State." Id.
167. See id.
168. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). This was an action brought in a United
States court in Indiana to enforce an Ohio judgment, prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment. Without "implied consent," the Court indicates that the
judgment could not be enforced outside Ohio. Note that after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, the Ohio judgment could not even be enforced within Ohio.
See note 16 supra. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189 (1915); SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 24, comment e at 135-36.
169. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 407-08.
170. See text accompanying note 165-66 supra.
171. Cal. Stat. 1861, ch. 432, § 1, at 496. Note that "[t]he condition that a
foreign corporation, if it does business in the State, shall consent to be sued need not be
expressed in the statute. It may as well be found from an interpretation of all the
legislation of the State as from the express language of any particular statute." 1 J.
BEALE, supra note 166, at 387.
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tinued to develop in Supreme Court cases subsequent to Lafayette.
17 2
As a matter of due process the Court required that the foreign corpora-
tion be "doing business" within the forum state before the fiction of
"implied consent" could subject the corporation to suit in that state.
17 3
No significant California cases involving the definition of the Cali-
fornia "doing business" statute were decided until the turn of the cen-
tury. At that time, without mentioning California's prerogative of
imposing a more stringent meaning, the courts adopted the then cur-
rent Supreme Court criteria for determining when a foreign corpora-
tion was "doing business" within the state.174 By adopting the federal
"doing business" guidelines as its own, the California judiciary prevented
the statutory "doing business" requirement from placing any greater
restriction on the state's jurisdictional power than were placed upon it by
the due process clause.'
75
The fiction of "implied consent" was not necessary to subject a
domestic corporation to the state's jurisdiction. The prevailing opinion
at that time that a corporation "must dwell in the place of its creation,
and cannot migrate to another sovereignity"'176 led at least one Cali-
fornia court to express its view that even if all the business of a domestic
corporation was done outside California the corporation would still
be a resident of the state.177  The problem of serving process on a
domestic corporation when all of its representatives are outside the
state is discussed below.'7 8
Mandatory Designation of Agent for Service
of Process: Foreign Corporations
As noted above, in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French 79 the Su-
preme Court held that a state could require a foreign corporation to
submit to certain conditions in order to transact business in the state.'80
172. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 65 (1871).
173. "It [a foreign corporation] cannot migrate, but may exercise its authority
in a foreign territory upon such conditions as may be prescribed by the law of the
place. One of these conditions may be that it consent to be sued there. If it do
business [sic] there it will be presumed to have assented and win be bound accordingly."
Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 81 (1871).
174 See, e.g., Doe v. Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co., 104 F. 684 (9th Cir. 1900);
Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., 2 Cal. App. 582, 84 P. 289 (1906).
175. See text accompanying notes 15-23, 43-45 supra.
176. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839), which is
popularly quoted for its dictum to this effect.
177. See McKendrick v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 165 Cal. 24, 29, 130 P. 865,
868 (1913); see note 194 infra.
178. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
179. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
180. See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra.
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While that decision may have stimulated the enactment of the 1861
amendment to section 29 of the Practice Act,' there were also later
California statutes requiring, as a condition of transacting business in
California, that the foreign corporation formally designate a resident 82
or public officer 83 on whom process could be served. Similar require-
ments are found today in Corporations Code section 6403.184
If the foreign corporation was "doing business" in the state, but
did not formally designate an agent, service could still be made on a
person specified by Code of Civil Procedure section 411.185
Substituted Service on Public Officers: Foreign Corporations
Where a foreign corporation "doing business" in California had
not formally designated a person to receive service of process, and had
no person in the state to whom process could be delivered under sec-
tion 411, service by publication or substituted service on a state officer
would seem to have been the only possible means of acquiring in
personam jurisdiction.'8 6  After the California Supreme Court decided
De la Montanya v. De la Montanya'8 7 in 1896, chances of acquiring
181. Cal. Stat. 1861, ch. 432, § 1, at 496.
182. Cal. Stat. 1871-72, ch. 566, §§ 1-3, at 826; Cal. Stat. 1870, ch. 578, §§ 1-5,
at 881.
183. Cal. Stat. 1899, ch. 94, §§ 1-4, at 111, amending Cal. Stat. 1871-72, ch. 566,
§§ 1-3, at 826.
184. CAL. CoRp. CODE § 6403: "A foreign corporation shall not transact intra-
state business . . without having first obtained from the Secretary of State a certificate
of qualification. To obtain such certificate, the corporation shall file . . .a statement
and designation . . .which shall set forth all of the following: . .. (e) The name
of an agent upon whom process directed to the corporation may be served within this
State. The agent may be a natural person residing within the State .. .or it may be a
domestic corporation . . . or a foreign corporation . . . . (f) Its irrevocable consent to
service of process directed to it upon the agent designated, and to service of process on
the Secretary of State if the agent so designated . . . is no longer authorized to act or
cannot be found at the address given."
185. "If it was a foreign corporation doing business in the state, then, under the
act of 1870 [Cal. Stat. 1869-70, ch. 578, § 1, at 881], it would be required to have
a designated agent in the state authorized to receive service of process and personal
service could be made upon him. If no such agent had been designated, then, under
the original section 411 of the Code, service could be made upon any managing or
business agent, cashier, or secretary of such corporation within the state." McKendrick
v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 165 Cal. 24, 28, 130 P. 865, 867 (1913).
186. The acquisition of in personam jurisdiction by publication was evidently con-
sidered acceptable by California courts prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the Pennoyer v. Neff decision in 1878. See Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391
(1868); Douglas v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 304 (1854). 'There are two modes
of obtaining jurisdiction over the person of a defendant: First, by personal service
of the summons, with a copy of the complaint; second, by constructive service, or
what is commonly designated publication of summons." Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. at
403. See note 16 & text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
187. 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896).
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in personam jurisdiction by publication in accordance with sections
412 and 413188 were quite slim,189 and there was as yet no general
provision for substituted service on a public officer.' 90 In 1899, how-
ever, the legislature enacted a statute providing for substituted service
on the Secretary of State in the event that a foreign corporation "doing
business" in the state failed to designate an agent, or, if designated, that
agent died or left the state.' 9 ' Essentially similar provisions are pres-
ently contained in Corporations Code section 6501.192
Mandatory Designation of Agent for Service
of Process and Substituted Service on
Public Officers: Domestic Corporations
In California's early history, there were very few reported cases
involving domestic corporations where all the officers or persons on
whom process could be served under section 411 were outside the
state. One case,'93 an in rem action, brought this problem before a
California court in 1912. Stating that for purposes of Code of Civil
Procedure section 412 a domestic corporation could depart from the
state,' 9 4 the court upheld jurisdiction based on service by publication
188. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 412-13 (1872); see note 107 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 214-21 infra for a similar conclusion as to the
use of sections 412 and 413 in acquiring jurisdiction over "absent' domestic corpora-
tions.
190. But see Cal. Pol. Code § 616 (1872), as amended, Cal. Code Amnds.
1877-78, ch. 604, § 6, at 17 (providing for substituted service on Insurance Commis-
sioner).
191. Cal. Stat. 1899, ch. 94, §§ 1-2, at 111, amending Cal. Stat. 1871-72, ch.
566, § 1-3, at 826.
192. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 6501: "If the agent designated for the service of process,
. . . cannot be found with due diligence . . . or if the agent designated is no longer
authorized to act, or if no agent has been designated and if no one of the officers or
agents of the corporation specified in Section 6500 [president or other head, vice
president, secretary, assistant secretary, general manager in this state, etc.] can be
found after diligent search and it is so shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the
court or judge, then the court or judge may make an order that service be made by
personal delivery to the Secretary of State.. ....
193. McKendrick v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 165 Cal. 24, 130 P. 865 (1913).
194. "It is true. . . that a domestic corporation is deemed to have a legal residence
in this state, although it may do no business at all and all its officers, agents and
stockholders may reside out of this state. Being a legal resident for many purposes, it
seems anomalous to say that it may depart from the state, but we think under the provi-
sions of the code, properly construed, it may be so held. Our courts have jurisdiction
of civil actions and this includes power to bring before them . . . the parties whose
rights and interests are to be determined. . . . Doubtless if there were no enabling
statutes prescribing a process to be used, the courts, being vested by the constitution
with jurisdiction of civil actions, could frame suitable writs and direct a reasonable
mode of service. Section 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure, expressly declares that
this may be done where necessary. The power. . . should not be resorted to in any
case where the existing statute may reasonably be construed to provide for process.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
made pursuant to that section. This decision encouraged discussion
about whether sections 412 and 413 might also support jurisdiction in
an in personam action against a domestic corporation where the persons
specified in section 411 could not be found within the state. 195 In
many other states, 96 extraterritorial service on officers of domestic
corporations was not considered inconsistent with the rule of Pennoyer
v. Neff. 9 7  Those states reasoned, first, that a domestic corporation
could not leave the state of its creation, and second, that extraterritorial
service met the adequate notice requirement.'9 8 California's position
very likely would have been that a corporation, having departed from
the state for purposes of section 412, must be treated the same as an
absent domiciliary. 9 9  In other words, the De la Montanya20 0 decision,
denying extraterritorial service as a means of acquiring in personam
jurisdiction over an absent domiciliary, would probably have been
extended to apply to an absent domestic corporation. There were, how-
ever, no reported cases on this point prior to the enactment of statutes
disposing of the problem in 1931201 and 1941.202 The 1931 statute
allowed domestic corporations to formally designate an agent for service
of process, and provided for substituted service on the Secretary of
State in the event no formal designation was made and none of the per-
For these reasons the provisions prescribing the process and mode of service upon
persons who cannot be personally reached, should receive a most liberal construction
... . In the case of a domestic corporation, all of whose agents and officers upon
whom service can be made, its actual body, in point of fact, for this purpose, have
departed from the state, we think is not too great a stretch of construction to hold that
the corporation itself. . . has departed from the state, within the purview of section 412
of the Code of Civil Procedure." McKendrick v. Western Zinc Mining Co., 165 Cal.
24, 29, 130 P. 865, 868 (1913).
195. See Note, Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction: Validity of Service On a Domestic
Corporation Whose Officers Are Outside the Forum in an In Personam Action, 18
CALIF. L. REV. 409 (1930).
196. See, e.g., Bennett v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co., 201 Iowa 770, 208 N.W.
519 (1926); Straub v. Lyman Land & Inv. Co., 30 S.D. 310, 138 N.W. 957 (1912),
aff'd on rehearing, 31 S.D. 571, 141 N.W. 979 (1913).
197. 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding in personam jurisdiction not acquired where
defendant not personally served within the state).
198. See Straub v. Lyman Land & Inv. Co., 30 S.D. 310, 138 N.W. 957 (1912),
aff'd on rehearing, 31 S.D. 571, 141 N.W. 957 (1913); Note, Conflict of Laws: Juris-
diction: Validity of Service on a Domestic Corporation Whose Officers Are Outside
the Forum in an In Personam Action, 18 CALiF. L. REV. 409 (1930); Annot., 126
A.L.R. 1474, 1494 (1940).
199. Note, Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction: Validity of Service on a Domestic
Corporation Whose Officers Are Outside the Forum in an In Personam Action, 18
CALIF. L. REV. 409 (1930).
200. 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896).
201. Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 862, § 373, at 1820.
202. Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 1230, § 1, at 3088.
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sons specified in section 411 could be found within the state; 03 the 1941
amendment provided for substituted service on the Secretary of State
where, although an agent had been formally designated, neither the
designated agent nor the persons specified in section 411 could be found
within the state.20 4 Essentially similar provisions are found in the pres-
ent Corporations Code sections 3301 and 3302,205 which are incor-
porated by reference into Code of Civil Procedure section 411, subdi-
vision 1.200
Doing Business and the Presence Theory
As noted above,20 7 the Supreme Court was willing to find a foreign
corporation's "implied consent" to suit in another state only where the
corporation was found by the Court to be "doing business" within that
state.208 The vagueness of the term "doing business" led to consider-
able litigation over its meaning, and quantitative tests came to be the
main criteria in deciding when a corporation was "doing business"
within the state.200  For example, in 1907, in Green v. Chicago,
203. Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 862, § 373, at 1820; see Howell, The Work of the
1941 California Legislature, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1941).
204. Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 1230, § 1, at 3088; see Howell, supra note 203, at 7.
205. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3301 (operative Jan. 1, 1971): "Every domestic corpora-
tion ... shall file with the Secretary of State, . . . a statement of the names and
complete business or residence addresses of its president, secretary, and treasurer, to-
gether with a statement of the location and address of its principal office. If desired,
the statement may designate, as the agent of such corporation for the purpose of service
of process, any natural person residing in this state or any corporation which has com-
plied with [the pertinent section of the Corporation Code requiring that corporate
agents for services of process file prescribed certificates with the Secretary of State] and
whose capacity to act as such agent has not terminated."
CAL. CORP. CODE § 3302 (operative July 1, 1970): "If designation of an agent
for the purpose of service of process has not been filed with the Secretary of State, or
if the agent designated cannot with reasonable diligence by found at the address desig-
nated for delivery by hand of the process, and it is shown by affidavit to the satisfac-
tion of a court or judge that process against a domestic corporation cannot be served
with reasonable diligence upon the designated agent by hand or upon the domestic
corporation in the manner provided for in Section 415.10 or 415.30 of the Code of
Civil Procedure or subdivision (a) of Section 415.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
court or judge may make an order that the service be made upon the corporation by
delivering by hand to the Secretary of State. . .one copy of the process for each de-
fendant to be served, together with a copy of the order authorizing such service.
Service in this manner constitutes personal service upon the corporation." The above
sections correspond to identically numbered sections now in effect.
206. See note 2 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra.
208. E.g., Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65 (1871).
209. Compare West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 720, 726-30,
128 P.2d 777, 780-82 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943), with International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.,
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B. & Q. Ry.,210 the Court said that mere solicitation of sales would not
be "doing business." '' A further statement by the Court, however,
portended the emergence of a new fiction on which courts were later
to base their acquisition of jurisdiction:
[V]alidity [of jurisdiction] depends upon whether the corpora-
tion was doing business in that district in such a manner and
to such an extent as to warrant the inference that through its
agents it was present there.
212
The effort put into the search for the meaning of the term "doing
business," itself a court-created term supporting the "implied consent"
fiction, had a significant effect on the emergence of an additional fic-
tion based on the amorphous concept of "presence. '2 13  A foreign
corporation's constructive "presence" in the state was thus to become
recognized as a new basis on which courts could justify their acquisition
of jurisdiction.
Each fiction, however, was based upon, and consequently re-
quired, (as did Code of Civil Procedure section 411, subdivision 2,214) a
finding that the foreign corporation was "doing business" within the
state.' 5  Thus the shift of emphasis from "implied consent" to "pres-
ence," as a basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, had no effect
on California.
In West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court,216 decided in 1942, the
California Supreme Court gave full recognition to the "presence" theory
and summarized the history of its development.21 The court, expand-
ing upon the criteria necessary to find the corporation "present,"
quoted a Cardozo opinion defining "presence" as doing business with
a fair measure of permanence and continuity, so that it can be said the
corporation is "here."2 8 The West Publishing Co. decision typifies the
California courts' past and present willingness to adopt as their own the
205 U.S. 530 (1907); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 909, 922-23 (1960).
210. 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
211. Id. at 534.
212 Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1916) (not
sufficient "presence"); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)
(sufficient "presence"); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913) (not
sufficient "presence").
214. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2) (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
215. See generally, 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 382-88
(1935).
216. 20 Cal. 2d 720, 128 P.2d 777 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
217. Id. at 726-30, 128 P.2d at 780-82.




federal basis of jurisdiction guidelines.
Doing Business at the Time of Service of Process
Whether a particular California court made reference in its de-
cision to the "implied consent" fiction 219 or to the "presence" fiction,22
a foreign corporation had to be "doing business" within the state,
221
and this was held to mean "doing business" at the time of service of
process. 222  This rule meant that a foreign corporation was outside
the reach of California courts where, after a cause of action had arisen,
the corporation ceased "doing business" within the state prior to service
of process. In 1933, in an attempt to resolve this problem, the legis-
lature enacted the statutory predecessor2 23 to Corporations Code section
6504.224 The 1933 statute provided for service on the Secretary of
State in such a situation, with two important limitations: First, some
part22 5 of the business transacted 226 in the past must have been intra-
state; and second, the cause of action must have arisen out of that
intrastate business.
227
219. See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 207-18 supra.
221. A corporation had to be "doing business" in the state in order to satisfy the
due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583, 589 (1914). It was also a statutory jurisdictional
requirement. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 343, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 411(2)
(effective until July, 1970).
222. See Doe v. Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co., 104 F. 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1900);
Davenport v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. 506, 508, 191 P. 911, 911 (1920); Thew Shovel
Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 95 P.2d 149, 153 (1939); Jameson v.
Simonds Saw Co., 2 Cal. App. 582, 584-85, 84 P. 289, 290 (1906).
223. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 533, § 91, at 1418. This type of statute was first
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Superior Court, 289
U.S. 361 (1933).
224. CAL. CORP. CODE § 6504: "A foreign corporation which has transacted intra-
state business in this State and has thereafter withdrawn from business in this State
may be served with process in the manner provided by this chapter in any action
brought in this State arising out of such business ....
225. See Oro Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d 884, 187 P.2d
444 (1947).
226. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 6203: "'Transact intrastate business' means entering
into repeated and successive transactions of its business in this State, other than intra-
state or foreign commerce." The words "transact intrastate business," as defined above,
are not the equivalent of "doing business in this State," as used in Cal. Stat. 1968, ch.
132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2) (effective until July 1, 1970).
See Borgward v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72, 76, 330 P.2d 789, 791 (1958).
227. See Oro Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d 884, 187 P.2d
444 (1947), which involved a personal injury that occurred in Oregon. It was held,
with no discussion whether the action arose out of activity involving intrastate busi-
ness, that the California court could acquire jurisdiction. The case may indicate a
tendency of the court toward a liberal application of the statute.
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Causes of Action Arising Outside the State
A domestic corporation may be analogized to an individual found
within a state. 2  Once properly served, 9 the state has always had
the power to render an in personam judgment on transitory causes of
action arising both inside and outside the state.230 Justification for
such broad powers over a domestic corporation lies in the fact that the
corporation originally chooses the state of incorporation and, thus,
should not later be allowed to object to the inconvenience of defending
a suit there;23 1 also, a plaintiff in a suit against the corporation is guar-
anteed at least one forum in which he may bring any action.23 2
In contrast to the domestic corporation is the properly served
233
foreign corporation doing business in the proposed forum state. Under
the law prior to International Shoe Co. v. Washington234 and Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,2 35 it was necessary to examine
the type of statute under which such service was made in order to deter-
mine whether a suit could be maintained on a cause of action having no
relation to the foreign corporation's activity in the forum state.236
Where service on a resident of the state or on a state official was
based upon the actual consent of the foreign corporation, even though
the consent was given in compliance with a statute, it was generally held
to be voluntarily given;23 thus, it was consent to be sued on any cause
of action, whether it arose out of activity in the forum state or not.
There were only two notable California decisions on this point, and each
was decided in a federal court. Both, contrary to the above mentioned
general rule, held that in the absence of a ruling of the highest court of
California, compliance with the statute requiring formal designation of
an agent to receive service of process should not be interpreted as con-
sent to jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from business done
228. See text accompanying notes 77-80.
229. The problem of serving process on an "absent" domestic corporation is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 193-206 supra.
230. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS 41, comment b at 212.
231. See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV.
909, 933-34 (1960).
232. See id.
233. The problem of serving process on "absent" foreign corporations is dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 179-92 supra.
234. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
235. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
236. See Developments in the Law-Conflict of Laws: 1935-1936, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 1119, 1134-35 (1937).
237. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U.S. 93, 96 (1917); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y.
432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916). See generally Annot., 145 A.L.R. 630 (1943).
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outside California.23 8  Later California decisions saw a reversal of posi-
tion, indicating that the broad Supreme Court interpretation
239 would
in the future be applied.
240
In contrast to the situation in which the foreign corporation has
actually consented to service of process on a designated agent, is the
situation in which a statute deems a foreign corporation "doing busi-
ness" within the state to have "impliedly consented" to service upon one
of its officers or agents, or upon a public officer of the state. Despite
one early California case to the contrary, 241 the rule in such cases was
that the "implied consent" of the foreign corporation extended only to
causes of action arising from business done within the state.242 Two
Supreme Court cases, Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn v. McDonough
243
and Simon v. Southern Ry.244 were commonly recognized as the au-
thority for this view. 245 In 1915, a California case decided in the Ninth
238. Miner v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 16 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.D. Cal.
1936); see Dunn v. Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co., 152 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1945).
239. See text accompanying note 237 supra.
240. See, e.g., Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n of Northern California, Inc., 342 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965);
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237
P.2d 297 (1951); Note, Suing Foreign Corporations in California, 5 STAN. L. Rav.
503, 508-09 (1953).
241. Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Roller, 100 F. 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1900).
242. "When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented
to the appointment of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact
it has consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the
court, for purposes of justice, treats it as if it had. It is true that the consequences so
imputed to it lie within its own control, since it need not do business within the state,
but that is not equivalent to a consent; actually it might have refused to appoint,
and yet its refusal would make no difference. The court, in the interests of justice,
imputes results to the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign state, quite
independently of any intent.
'The limits of that consent are as independent of any actual intent as the consent
itself. Being a mere creature of justice it will have such consent only as justice re-
quires; hence it may be limited, as it had been limited in [Simon v. Southern Ry., 236
U.S. 115 (1915); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907)]."
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)
(Learned Hand, J.).
243. 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
244. 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
245. See Scott, Turisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32
HAv. L. REv. 871, 882-83, 890 (1919). But cf. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (Cardozo, J.). "We hold, then, that the defendant
corporation is engaged in business within this state. We hold further that the jurisdic-
tion does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to
the business here transacted. That in principle was our ruling in [Bagdon v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916)]. We ap-
plied it there to a case where service had been made on an agent designated by the
corporation . . . . It applies, however, with equal force to a case where service has
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Circuit, Fry v. Denver & R.G. Ry.,246 followed the Old Wayne and
Simon decisions. In its decision the court summed up the problem,
stating:
[I]t is not enough in such a case that the foreign corporation be
doing business in the state where sued, but it must appear that
the cause of action arose from the business there done.
241
In Fry, the statute upon which the service of process was based provided
for service upon an agent of the corporation, whereas, in Old Wayne
and Simon, the pertinent statutes provided for service upon a public
officer of the state. The court in Fry, however, refused to attach any
importance to this factual distinction. It was the court's opinion that
whether the statute provided for service upon an agent of the corpora-
tion or upon a public officer, the implied consent should extend only to
causes of action arising from business done within the state.
248
Then in 1951, the court of appeal in Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij v. Superior Court,219 in effect overruled Fry, holding
that under the "presence" theory a California court could acquire
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising in England which was com-
pletely unconnected with business done in California. 2 °  The court
implied that if Old Wayne and Simon applied at all, it would be in
cases in which service was made on public officers, and not in this case
(nor as in Fry) where an agent of the corporation was served.
251
The Old Wayne and Simon decisions, which, under the narrowest
interpretation, denied jurisdiction over foreign cause of action when
service was made on a state officer without the express consent of the
foreign corporation, were finally discredited by the Supreme Court in
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.252  Soon thereafter, the
been made upon an officer or managing agent . . . . The essential thing is that the
corporation shall have come into the state. When once it is here, it may be served;
and the validity of the service is independent of the origin of the cause of action."
Id. at 268-69, 115 N.E. at 918.
246. 226 F. 893 (9th Cir. 1915).
247. Id. at 895.
248. Id.
249. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
250. Id. at 501, 237 P.2d at 301.
251. Id. at 498-99, 237 P.2d at 299-300.
252. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a foreign
corporation carrying on continuous and systematic activity in Ohio could be subjected
to the jurisdiction of an Ohio court on a cause of action arising outside Ohio and inde-
pendent of the corporation's activities there. The Court determined that as a matter
of due process the business done in Ohio by the defendant foreign corporation was
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to allow the acquisition of jurisdiction
by the Ohio court. The holding is expressly based on the realistic reasoning of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), rather than alluding to the
fictions that had supported the acquisition of jurisdiction in the past. 342 U.S. at
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
California decision in Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co.253 indicated
that in the future California would also consider Old Wayne and Simon
to be relics of a bygone era. Thus, service of process on the Secretary of
State, even where consent was merely implied and not express, was no
longer a deterrent to the acquisition of jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising outside California.
Milliken v. Meyer and International Shoe Co. v. Washington:
A New Perspective for California
Between 1849 and the early 1940's the ability of a California court
to acquire personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation expanded
as much as the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would
allow. In contrast, the ability of a California court to acquire personal
jurisdiction over an individual absent from the state experienced little
change; in fact, the application of the Pennoyer "territorial" doctrine
reduced the scope of the jurisdiction that the courts had enjoyed up
to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. No longer could a plain-
tiff obtain, by publication of summons, the type of ex parte personal
judgment that was formerly recognized in California but was not, under
the full faith and credit clause, required to be recognized in other states.
Also, the California Supreme Court, in De la Montanya v. De la Mon-
tanya254 in 1896, interpreted the Pennoyer doctrine, as did many states
at the time, to apply to absent residents as well as absent nonresidents.
Pennoyer and De la Montanya, thus applied, were major factors con-
tributing to the lack of growth in the ability of California courts to ac-
quire personal jurisdiction over absent individuals.
California's only significant extension of its bases of jurisdiction
over individuals during this period was the enactment in 1935 of
the nonresident motorist statute which remains in force substantially
unchanged to this day.255 That statute provides for substituted
service on the Director of Motor Vehicles when a motorist commits
certain acts within the state. Theoretically, the nonresident motorist
446-47. Commenting on the lower court's reliance upon Old Wayne Life Ass'n
v. McDonough and Simon v. Southern Railway, the Court stated: "At the time of
rendering the above decisions this Court was aided, in reaching its conclusion as to the
limited scope of the statutory authority of the public officials, by this Court's concep-
tion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a state from
giving its public officials authority to accept service in terms broad enough to bind a
foreign corporation in proceedings against it to enforce an obligation arising outside
of the state of the forum. That conception now has been modified by the rationale
adopted in later decisions and particularly in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."
Id. at 444.
253. 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130 (1953).
254. 112 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896).
255. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 27, § 404, at 154, as amended, CAL. VEH. CODE § 17451.
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statute closely resembles the statutes that allow substituted service on
the Secretary of State where a foreign corporation is otherwise "un-
servable" within the state.25 6 Each provides for substituted service on
a public officer, and each was originally based upon the fiction of
"implied consent." The state could require a foreign corporation to
"impliedly consent" to service on the Secretary of State as a condition of
doing business in the state since corporations were not protected by the
privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution. 257  The
state's authority to require an individual to "impliedly consent" to serv-
ice on a public officer was based on its regulatory police power over
persons operating dangerous equipment within the state.258
Two landmark Supreme Court cases259 in the 1940's provided
California with the opportunity to further expand its present bases of
jurisdiction over both corporations and individuals. In Milliken v.
Meyer,2 60 the Pennoyer rule requiring service of process within the state
was held to be inapplicable to absent domiciliaries. The Supreme Court
held a Wyoming statute authorizing extraterritorial personal service upon
a defendant domiciliary to be in compliance with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and a decision rendered pursuant to that
statute was entitled to full faith and credit. In International Shoe Co.
v. Washington,261 the Court upheld jurisdiction in an in personam ac-
tion against a foreign corporation by abandoning the "presence" fiction
and the "doing business" requirement in favor of a qualitative test to
determine whether the corporation's relationship with the state was
adequate to meet the due process requirement. The new theory adopted
by the Court required only that there be such "minimum contacts" with
the state that the maintenance of the suit would not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
' 262
Millikin v. Meyer provided California courts with a new oppor-
tunity to overrule the 1896 De la Montanya decision and assert in
personam jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, however, by abandoning the quantitative "doing
business" requirement for acquiring personal jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation, created a dilemma for the California courts since
California still had a statute requiring a finding of "doing business."
On the one hand, California could continue to apply the old quantitative
256. See text accompanying notes 186-92, 219-27 supra.
257. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
258. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
259. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
260. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
261. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
262. Id. at 316.
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tests263 used prior to International Shoe; on the other hand, the literal
interpretation of "doing business" might be replaced with the qualita-
tive tests set out in International Shoe. The former course would cause
the California courts to fall behind the current trends; the latter course
might be attacked as an encroachment upon the power of the legisla-
ture.
264
As discussed below, the California courts were hesitant to over-
rule De la Montanya, in spite of Milliken v. Meyer. The California
legislature, however, apparently concerned that the courts would eventu-
ally overrule De la Montanya and permit the acquisition of personal
jurisdiction on terms less stringent than the actual facts of Miliken v.
Meyer, enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 417.265 Section 417,
when adopted, was more restrictive than the dictum in Milliken v.
Meyer seemed to indicate was necessary. Much importance lles in
the fact that its adoption precluded the potential use of sections 412
and 413 as a "long-arm" statute to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents. On the other hand, the abandonment of "doing business"
within the state as a federal due process requirement for suing a foreign
corporation generated no legislative action whatsoever. The California
judiciary, left to its own devices, came up with a courageous bit of
"judicial legislation '266 interpreting the statutory "doing business" re-
quirement to be the equivalent of the due process requirements set out
in International Shoe.
Individuals: Milliken v. Meyer, 1940 to 1970
Immediately following Milliken v. Meyer, the California courts had
the opportunity to overrule De la Montanya by recognizing domicile as
a basis for acquiring jurisdiction. Any hope that the Milliken rule
might be adopted, however, was lost when the case of Pinon v. Pollard
was decided.267 Dicta in Pinon indicated that a California court,
despite the Milliken decision, could not tender a personal judgment in a
case where service was made upon a defendant domiciliary while he
was absent from the state.268
A tendency toward conservatism best describes the Pinon opinion.
263. See text accompanying notes 207-12 supra.
264. Most states to some degree, faced this dilemma after the International Shoe
decision. Through 1960, state courts "for the most part have sought a middle
ground, requiring less activity than in the past, but not interpreting the statutes so as
to extend them to the outer limits apparently permitted by International Shoe." De-
velopments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 1000 (1960).
265. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 935, § 1, at 2537.
266. See Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958).
267. 69 Cal. App. 2d 129, 158 P.2d 254 (1945).
268. Id. at 132, 158 P.2d at 256.
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Like the De la Montanya court 62 years earlier, the Pinon court ap-
plied the Pennoyer rule to absent residents, even though Pennoyer in-
volved only service of process upon a nonresident.
Enactment and Application of Section 417: 1951 to 1957
In 1946, the State Bar Committee on the Administration of Justice
recommended the adoption of a new section to be numbered 417, which
read as follows:
Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of
this state by publication of summons in accordance with Sections
412 and 413 of this Code, the Court shall have power to render a
personal judgment against such person only if he was personally
served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was domi-
ciled in this state at the time of the commencement of the action,
or at the time of service.
269
Basically, the State Bar was attempting to bring the California statutes
within the reasoning of Milliken v. Meyer,2 70 but it also expressed the
fear that without the proposed section, the California courts might at-
tempt to exercise their jurisdiction beyond a desirable limit:
[T]here is some danger that the courts of this state may disregard
the opinion in the case of Pinon v. Pollard . . . and follow the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Milliken v. Meyer
. . . and sustain a personal judgment on less than the requirements
in the proposed Section 417.271
The grounds for such apprehension were evidently twofold. First,
dictum in Milliken indicated that the Court might approve the acquisi-
tion of personal jurisdiction over an absent domiciliary without requir-
ing service of process on his person.272 Second, the trend expanding
the bases on which jurisdiction could be exercised was noted, and an
269. Committee on Administration of Justice 1945-46, Cal. State Bar Ass'n, Service
of Process, 21 CAL. ST. B.J. 166, 169 (1946).
270. id.
271. Committee on Administration of Justice, Cal. State Bar Ass'n, Personal Serv-
ice Outside the State, 23 CAL. ST. B.J. 196 (1948).
272. The Court stated in Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), that "adequacy
so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the form of sub-
stituted service . . . is reasonably calculated to give . . . actual notice of the proceed-
ings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice . . . are satisfied." Id. at 463. The Court went on to say "one . . .
incidence of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns with-
out the state, where the state has provided and employed a reasonable method for
apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him." Id. at 464. The
Calbfornia State Bar's apprehension may have been further iustified by the Court's
subsequent statement in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
that "due process requires only that in order to subject defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice'." Id. at 316.
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apparently defense-oriented legal and legislative community seemed con-
cerned that the California courts might prematurely apply the recently
propounded "minimum contacts" principles of International Shoe Co.
v. Washington273 to cases involving nonresident individuals.
274
For whatever the reason, section 417 was finally adopted with one
variation in 1951.275 The legislature replaced the phrase "and was
domiciled in this state" as originally recommended by the State Bar
Association, 276 with the phrase "was a resident of this state." Subse-
quent decisions equating residence with domicile, for purposes of sec-
tion 417, rendered the change insignificant.277
Section 417, on its face, approved the exercise of personal juris-
diction in situations where, from the time of De la Montanya, it had
been prohibited. Many instances arose, however, in which section 417
would be of no help to a person attempting to acquire jurisdiction over
an absent resident. While discussing section 417 in Cradduck v. Fi-
nancial Indemnity Co., 7 s the court commented upon one such in-
stance as follows:
Obviously the section presupposes a defendant whose whereabouts
outside the State of California are known-one who can be reached
in another state for personal service of summons.
27 9
It is important to note, however, that the principle laid down in
Cradduck was modified in the later case of Hayes v. Risk.2 80 In Hayes,
the defendant was a resident at the time the action commenced, but left
the jurisdiction prior to service. The court held that where the de-
fendant has concealed himself within or without the jurisdiction, the
personal service requirements of section 417 cannot prevent a judgment
against the defendant and therefore must yield to the provisions of sec-
tion 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure which permit service on the
defendant by publication where he has concealed himself to avoid service
of process.28 '
As illustrated by Cradduck (modified by Hayes) not only must
273. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
274. See California Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar, Selected
1957 Code Legislation, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 501, 531-32 (1957). Acquisition of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals had been allowed in special situations prior to
Milliken and International Shoe. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623
(1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The possibility of further expan-
sion of this trend in the California courts, without prior legislative approval, may have
provided additional impetus for the legislature to enact section 417.
275. 2 Cal. Stat. 1951 (3d Extra. Sess. 1950), ch. 935, § 1, at 2537-38.
276. See text accompanying note 269 supra.
277. See Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953).
278. 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1966).
279. Id. at 854, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
280. 255 Cal. App. 2d 613, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1967).
281. Id. at 625-26, Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
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the defendant be located for personal service (at least in nonconcealment
cases), but he must also have been a resident of California at one of the
particular times specified in section 417. For example, in Chesin v.
Superior Court,28 the defendant allegedly committed a tort in California
while a resident of California; but before the action could be com-
menced, he became domiciled in Arizona. Although the defendant was
personally served in Arizona, the court could not acquire personal juris-
diction.
The case of Allen v. Superior Court,28 3 which first upheld the
validity of section 417, well summarizes the positive effects of the new
statute. The California court implied for the first time since De la
Montanya that sections 412 and 413, even without the enactment of
section 417, would have been sufficient statutory authority to render
an in personam judgment against an absent resident.28  The court
explained that section 417 imposed specific limitations on the power that
California courts might otherwise exercise within the bounds of the due
process clause.285
The actual holding in Allen was that the defendant, being a domi-
ciliary when the action was commenced, was subjected to the jurisdiction
of the court when personally served with process outside the state. The
time lapse between the commencement of the action and the service
of process was so great,280 however, that as a matter of due process, the
court may have been extending its power beyond that allowed by
Milliken v. Meyer.28 7  In Milliken, domicile was determined as of the
282. 142 Cal. App. 2d 360, 298 P.2d 593 (1965).
283. 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953). Both plaintiff and defendant were
California residents involved in an automobile accident. Defendant subsequently
moved to Oregon, where he was personally served. It is important to note that the
accident occurred on Nov. 1, 1947; complaint was filed July 12, 1948, while the de-
fendant was a resident of California; thus the requirements of section 417 were met.
The defendant's subsequent change of domicile to Oregon in September of 1951 was
held not to vitiate the effectiveness of the publication in April of 1952 and the per-
sonal service in May of 1952. Id. at 313, 259 P.2d at 909; accord, Myrick v.
Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 519, 261 P.2d 235 (1953).
284. "California at all times under sections 412 and 413 of the Code of Civil
Procedure had the power to obtain in personam jurisdiction over petitioner for the
purposes of this action by means of such service of process as would satisfy the re-
quirements of due process." 41 Cal. 2d at 313, 259 P.2d at 909.
285. "[S]ection 417, as a clarifying statute, set forth the restrictive conditions
under which this state would assert in personam jurisdiction, thereby leaving no doubt
that this state was conforming in this regard with 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice . . . implicit in due process. . . .' As so construed, section 417 may
reasonably apply to pending as well as future litigation." Id. (citations omitted).
286. See note 283 supra.
287. See Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern
Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 198 (1958): "[I]n the Allen case the defendant did
not move until nearly four years after the action was in fact commenced. In such a
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time of service of process; but in Allen, domicile was determined as of
the time of the commencement of the action-advancing "one step be-
yond the Milliken case.
'288
Amendment to Section 417: A Limited Expansion
The 1957 amendment to section 417289 for the first time enabled
the California courts to acquire personal jurisdiction over absent resi-
dents, where such persons were residents at the time the cause of action
arose but not when the action was commenced.290  Thus, a defendant
could no longer deprive a California court of personal jurisdiction by es-
tablishing a new domicile subsequent to the commission of the wrong-
ful act.
29 '
At the time of its adoption it was well recognized that the 1957
amendment carried California's jurisdiction beyond that allowed in
Milliken v. Meyer, and might therefore lead to questions regarding its
constitutionality. Justice Traynor, in Owens v. Superior Court,292 ac-
knowledged this problem, stating:
Subdivision (b) of section 417 requires more than past domicile
in the state. There must have been domicile here at the time the
cause of action arose. Since jurisdiction so based rests neither
on an existing relationship nor on the right of the plaintiff to rely
on an existing relationship at the time he commences his action,
it may be debatable whether such jurisdiction can constitutionally
be assumed in the absence of some other relevant contacts with
the state. If, for example, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
were presently domiciled here and the cause of action arose out
of the defendant's activities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that
the defendant was domiciled here at the time the cause of action
arose might be too tenuous a basis for asserting jurisdiction over
hiM.
2 9 3
On the facts of the case, however, Traynor found additional contacts,
which either by themselves, or in conjunction with defendant's prior
domicile, fully supported jurisdiction:
In the present case the cause of action arose out of defend-
ant's activities in this state . . . . This fact alone is sufficient
case, it "may seriously be argued that domicile at the time of service should be required,
at least in the absence of a showing that the defendant had gone into hiding to avoid
service." Id. at 231. See note 283 supra.
288. Id.
289. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052.
290. Id. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 417 (effective until July 1, 1970): "[Tihe
court shall have the power to render a personal judgment.., if he was . .. a resident
of this state ... (b) at the time that the cause of action arose."
291. See Chesin v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 360, 363-64, 298 P.2d 593,
596 (1956).
292. 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959); see 48 CALIF. L. REv. 295 (1960).
293. 52 Cal. 2d at 829, 345 P.2d at 923-24.
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under the Due Process Clause to permit the courts of this state to
assert personal jurisdiction over him. 29 4
Traynor supported his position by first tracing the development of the
"minimum contact" basis of in personam jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations from International Shoe. He went on to point out, however,
that
[t]he rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited to for-
eign corporations, and both its language and the cases sustaining
jurisdiction over nonresident motorists make clear that the mini-
mum contacts test for jurisdiction applies to individuals as well as
foreign corporations. It is now settled that jurisdiction over non-
resident motorists does not rest on consent but on their activity in
the state. 29
5
Nevertheless, even though, as Traynor's opinion illustrates, mini-
mum contacts and "activity" might be relied upon to support in per-
sonam jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries, section 417 as amended
was still inadequate to provide California with a means of acquiring juris-
diction over nonresident individuals. Section 417 applied only to ab-
sent residents and not to absent nonresidents, and served to put "absent"
domestic corporations and absent residents on the same footing. Be-
cause section 417 imposed the requirements of residency (interpreted
for the purposes of that section as the equivalent of domicile),29 and
personal service outside the state, any reference to minimum contacts
was futile in the case of an absent nonresident.29 7 The 1957 amend-
ment did nothing to remedy this disparate treatment.
The case of Atkinson v. Superior Court29s illustrates the judicial
dissatisfaction with and desire to overcome the limiting effects of sec-
tion 417. In Atkinson, California musicians attempted to invalidate a
trust agreement between their employers and the American Federation
294. Id. at 830, 345 P.2d at 924.
295. Id. at 831, 345 P.2d at 924-25.
296. It should be noted that Allen, for purposes of section 417, is usually inter-
preted as having abolished the distinction between residence and domicile. Compare
Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953), with Owens v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 827, 345 P.2d 921, 922 (1959), Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235,
240-43, 288 P.2d 497, 499-501 (1955); and Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 445,
14 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418 (1961). See generally Reese & Green, That Elusive Word
"Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953): "[Tibe distinction between the two concepts
is often too shadowy to be capable of description." Id. at 580.
297. See Currie, Justice Traynor and the Confiict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719
(1961): "California's statutes providing for extraterritorial service of process were not,
and still are not, aptly designed to take advantage of the Supreme Court's relaxation in
recent years of due process restrictions." Id. at 763. See also Kurland, The Supreme
Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U.
Cm. L. RaV. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
298. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
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of Musicians, whereby part of the musicians' royalties and wages were
to be paid to a New York trustee. The musicians sought an injunction
until the validity of the trust agreement could be determined. The trial
court refused to issue the injunction because the out-of-state trustee, al-
though personally served with process in accord with sections 412
and 413, failed to meet the residency requirements of section 417 and
was therefore not personally subject to the court's jurisdiction.299  The
California Supreme Court, in an opinion straining the bounds of estab-
lished legal concepts, reversed, avoiding the section 417 problem by
finding that the trial court had acquired quasi in rem jurisdiction and
could therefore determine the nonresident trustee's interest in the Cali-
299. See id. at 346, 316 P.2d at 960. "[Slince the trustee is not and has not
been a resident of California, section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure precludes the
entry of a personal judgment against him, and it is therefore unnecessary to determine
whether his activities as trustee have sufficient connection with this state constitution-
ally to justify an assumption of personal jurisdiction without service of process ......
Id. See also Comment on Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 40 CAL. ST. BJ. 380
(1965). "But for section 417 the court in the Atkinson case would probably have held
that the non resident trustee was subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts."
Id. at 385.
In Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), a trust was created in Delaware in
which the settlor retained the power of appointment by inter vivos or testamentary
instrument. The settlor then became domiciled in Florida for eight years, until her
death, and was in constant communication with the trustee. While domiciled in Florida,
she appointed certain beneficiaries by an intervivos instrument, and on her death her
will devised all the remainder of her property. A Florida court held the trust and
power of appointment ineffective. The Delaware trust company did not appear, even
though it received notice by publication. A Delaware court sustained the trust in a
separate proceeding and refused to accord "full faith and credit" to the Florida deci-
sion. The United States Supreme Court held that the Florida court had no jurisdiction
over the trust or trustees and that the Florida court's decree was void due to the lack of
sufficient contact with the trustees. The Supreme Court distinguished the case from
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), on the ground that
the trustee in the principal case did not solicit business and performed no acts in
Florida. 'The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state....
[It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
yoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253. In his dissent,
Justice Black felt that "there is nothing fundamentally unfair in subjecting the cor-_
porate trustee to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. It chose to maintain business
relations with [the settlori in that state for eight years, regularly communicating with
her with respect to the business of the trust including the very appointment in ques-
tion." Id. at 259.
Hanson presents a strong analogue to Atkinson. The decree in Hanson, as in
Atkinson would not have affected the personal rights of the nonresident trustee. One
must distinguish the two cases by bearing in mind that the trust res in Hanson was not
in the forum state of Florida, thus mitigating the state's interest in the proceeding,
whereas in Atkinson it was in the forum state of California thus increasing the state's
interest.
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fornia property.300 Atkinson seems a clear illustration of the Cali-
fornia judiciary's desire during this period to keep pace with the ex-
panding concept of due process as conceptualized in the "minimum
contacts" doctrine.
In Crabtree v. Superior Court,301 the court again indicated its
dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed by section 417, by finding
another means of avoiding its application. In Crabtree, the court
resorted to section 416 in order to obtain personal jurisdiction because
the facts would not permit it under section 417. Observing that al-
though a court cannot acquire jurisdiction by publication over one who
has never been a resident, the court held that such jurisdiction can be
acquired by construing the nonresident's alleged special appearance as
a voluntary appearance,30 2 and therefore within the provisions of Code
of Civil Procedure section 416.303
It is interesting to note that shortly after deciding Atkinson, and
shortly before Crabtree, the California Supreme Court found a means
of justifying a wholesale adoption of the "minimum contacts" doctrine
in dealing with the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations."0 4 It seems probable that, had section 417 been drafted
a bit more loosely, the court might have applied the doctrine of "mini-
mum contacts" to nonresident individuals as well.
Corporations: International Shoe, 1945 to 1970
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,30 5 the Supreme Court
abandoned the quantitative and mechanical tests previously accompa-
nying the "presence" theory. 0 The State of Washington was suing to
recover unpaid state unemployment contributions from the foreign cor-
poration, International Shoe Company. The corporation, basing its
argument in part on the "mere solicitation" rule,307 insisted that it was
not amenable to suit in Washington since its activities in that state were
not sufficient to manifest its "presence" there.30 8 The Court suggested
300. 49 Cal. 2d at 348, 316 P.2d at 966.
301. 197 Cal. App. 2d 821, 17 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1961).
302. Id. at 827, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 768; accord, In re Lee, 123 Cal. App. 2d 882,
888, 267 P.2d 847, 851 (1954); Roberts v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 714, 720,
159 P. 465, 467 (1916).
303. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 22, at 1847, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 416 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970): "The voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to
personal service of the summons and copy of the complaint upon him."
304. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958).
305. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
306. See id. at 319.
307. See text accompanying notes 207-12 supra.
308. 326 U.S. at 315.
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that "the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation's agents within the state which the
courts will deem sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process."' 09
The Court, expressing its opinion on the demands of due process, stated:
[I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he [must]
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."310
International Shoe thus marks the beginning of a new era in which the
qualitative test set out above superseded the quantitative and mechani-
cal tests of the past.
Effect of International Shoe on 'TDoing Business"
in California: A Period of Uncertainty
The Supreme Court, by abandoning the "presence" fiction as a
basis of jurisdiction, had eliminated for the purposes of due process
under the fourteenth amendment the necessity of finding that a foreign
corporation was "doing business" within the state."' The qualitative
test, enunciated in International Shoe,31 2 was substituted by the Court
as the due process requirement for the assumption of jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation.31 3 Code of Civil Procedure section 411,314
nevertheless, continued to specify "doing business" as a California statu-
tory prerequisite for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and California deci-
sions continued to use the "presence" test in determining whether the
corporation was "doing business" in the state.315 Immediately after
the International Shoe decision, however, it apparently became easier
for some California courts to find the corporation "present"; the lan-
guage in many cases indicates the adoption of qualitative, in addition to
the old quantitative, considerations. 1 6
309. Id. at 316-17.
310. Id. at 316.
311. See id. at 318.
312. See text accompanying note 310 supra.
313. See text accompanying notes 18-19, 24-30 supra.
314. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2) (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970).
315. See, e.g., Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.
App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951); Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541 (1950); Boote's Hatcheries & Packing Co. v. Superior Court,
91 Cal. App. 2d 526, 205 P.2d 31 (1949); Oro Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 82
Cal. App. 2d 884, 187 P.2d 444 (1947).
316. See, e.g., Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968
(1952), where the court states: "The essence of doing business is that the corporation
is present within the state sufficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be
amenable to process within the state." Id. at 494, 244 P.2d at 970 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Labs., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 2d 211, 257
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Eight years after the International Shoe decision, a California court
summarized the then current state of the law in California:
[U]nder the evolving concept of the "doing business" requirement,
it is deducible from the cases that the essentials of due process are
fully met . . . if a foreign corporation maintains substantial con-
tacts with a state through a course of regularly-established and
systematic business activity, as distinguished from casual, isolated,
or insubstantial contacts or transactions.
317
As this quotation indicates, the law in California had not, in eight years,
progressed far from the "presence" theory. Strict adherence to the
"presence" theory in some cases, 318 apparent adoption of the "minimum
contacts" theory in others,319 and a commingling of the two theories
indicated from the language of others,"' reflected the uncertainty of
the California appellate courts of the meaning of "doing business."
Adoption of "Minimum Contacts" as Test
of "Doing Business" in California
The confusion generated by the International Shoe decision was
finally resolved by the California Supreme Court in Henry R. Jahn &
Son v. Superior Court.3"' In that case the court nullified the defend-
ant's argument that it was not sufficiently active within the state to be
deemed "present" and amenable to suit, 2 by declaring the "presence"
test obsolete.323 California's statutory basis of jurisdiction requirement
for foreign corporations-"doing business" within the state-was
equated with the federal due process requirement set out in International
Shoe. In other words, the term "doing business" in Code of Civil Pro-
P.2d 727 (1953), the court states: "[T]he expression 'doing business in this state,' as
used in section 411 of our Code of Civil Procedure (a term not defined by the stat-
ute), reflects the changing concept of 'doing business' as it has evolved over the years,
and as it continues to evolve, through the decisions of the federal courts interpreting
the due process clause and applying it to new and developing situations from time to
time." Id. at 222, 257 P.2d at 734.
317. Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 388, 265 P.2d 130,
137 (1953).
318. See, e.g., cases cited note 315 supra.
319. See, e.g., Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736,
307 P.2d 739 (1957); Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Labs., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 2d 211, 257
P.2d 727 (1953).
320. See, e.g., LeVecke v. Griesedieck W. Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1956) (applying California law); Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d
503, 246 P.2d 681 (1952); Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d
968 (1952).
321. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
322. See id. at 858-60, 323 P.2d at 439-40.
323. Id. at 858-59, 323 P.2d at 439-40. "The Supreme Court has emphasized its
departure from the presence test by the signficance it now attaches to the fact that the
cause of action arises out of the defendant's contacts with the state asserting juris-
diction." Id. at 860, 323 P.2d at 440.
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cedure section 411, subdivision 2, was held to require only that the
foreign corporation have "such minimum contacts with the state that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "324
Viewed in the light of California's past adoption of the federal due
process requirements of "implied consent" and "presence,"32 5 the "judi-
cial legislation ' 3 26 in Jahn seems to be quite a rational course; to have
held that the statutory term "doing business" should suddenly become
static until changed by the legislature would have been inconsistent with
the flexibility already acquired by the term over almost a century of
judicial expansion.
Subsequent to the adoption of the International Shoe test, the
Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to interpret it in only four
cases.3 27  From these cases many California courts developed a "check-
list" approach to be used as an aid in determining when a foreign cor-
poration had the necessary "minimum contacts" with the state. 28 The
approach was to be applied qualitatively, not mechanistically, with the
aim of attaining "fair play and substantial justice"; 3 29 and, as many
courts have noted, this involves practical considerations implicit in the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
3 3 0
Effect of Equating 'Doing Business" with "Minimum Contacts"
Of the four important cases331 decided by the Supreme Court sub-
sequent to International Shoe, McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co. 33 2 made the greatest impact upon previous notions of California's
jurisdictional prerequisites.33 3  In McGee, the Court held that service
324. Id. at 858, 323 P.2d at 439.
325. See text accompanying notes 165-75, 207-18 supra.
326. See Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 220,
325 P.2d 21, 26 (1958) (concurring opinion): "[MJudicial pronouncements have, in
disregard of the legislative prerogative, overridden the terms of the local statute."
327. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
328. See, e.g., Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225-26,
347 P.2d 1, 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4 (1959).
329. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Com-
ment, Extending "Minimum Contacts" to Alimony: Mizner v. Mizner, 20 HASTiNGS
LJ. 361, 366-67 (1969). But cf. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933,
943, 458 P.2d 57, 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 (1969).
330. See, e.g., Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 219,
325 P.2d 21, 25-26 (1958).
331. See cases cited note 327 supra.
332. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
333. See generally Note, Constitutional Law: State Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations 10 HAsTINGs L.. 206 (1959).
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on the California Insurance Commissioner, pursuant to the provisions
of the California Insurance Code,334 gave California jurisdiction of a
cause of action arising out of a Texas insurance company's only con-
tact-a single policy for a California domiciliary-with California.
Thus, a California policyholder, whose business with the company was
conducted exclusively by mail, was entitled to enforce the California
judgment in Texas.
Two requirements consistently demanded by California courts
prior to Jahn were rendered obsolete by McGee: first, that the corpora-
tion have some personal representative within the state;3 3 5 and second,
that the activities carried on by these representatives be substantial and
continuous.
336
Personal representation within the state
Florence Nightingale School of Nursing, Inc. v. Superior Court37
was the first California case to hold that a foreign corporation could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the state even though it had no repre-
sentatives of any sort within the state. The court upheld jurisdiction
over a cause of action arising out of California activity where the only
contact with persons in the state was by correspondence and through
advertising in magazines circulated in the state.33 " Other cases reached
essentially similar results by finding as representatives of corporations
persons of a more tenuous relationship to the corporation than had
been found in the past. For example, in Cosper v. Smith & Wesson
Arms Co.,"3 9 an allegedly defective gun manufactured by the defend-
ant corporation caused personal injury to the plaintiff in California.
The California Supreme Court found the requisite "minimum contact"
in sales made in the state through a nonexclusive manufacturer's repre-
sentative.340
334. CAL. INS. CODn § 1610: "Any of the acts described in Section 1611 [issuance
or delivery of contracts of insurance, solicitation of applications, collection of premi-
ums, or any other transactions arising out of such contracts], when effected in this
State, by mail or otherwise, by a foreign or alien insurer . . . shall constitute an
appointment by such insurer of the commissioner . . . to be its true and lawful at-
torney, upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding
... arising out of any such contracts of insurance. .. "
335. See text accompanying notes 337-42 infra.
336. See text accompanying notes 343-48 infra.
337. 168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959).
338. Id. at 75-76, 335 P.2d at 241-42. The California court stressed the simi-
larity in facts between the case at hand and Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 399
U.S. 643 (1950) (Nebraska mail-order insurance corporation soliciting new Virginia
customers through its old Virginia customers by mail was amenable to suit in Vir-
ginia).
339. 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959).
340. Id. at 81-83, 346 P.2d at 412-13. The court further held that service on the
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It has not been unusual for a California court to approve the ac-
quisition of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based upon the ac-
tivity of an affiliate in California.34 1 Nevertheless, in these cases, courts
look for some relationship beyond the mere ownership of stock of one
entity by the other or a third person.
342
Act or Acts Within the State
For some time after McGee was decided, some courts questioned
whether the Supreme Court intended to limit the McGee decision to in-
surance company cases. 343 A 1961 federal district court, concluding
that McGee was intended to be limited in its application to suits on in-
surance contracts under the special California statute, 344 refused to up-
nonexclusive manufacturer's representative was authorized under CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 6500 which provides: "Delivery by hand of a copy of any process against a foreign
corporation (a) to the president or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a
secretary, an assistant secretary, the general manager in this State . . . shall constitute
valid service on the corporation." The court, supporting its position that the nonexclu-
sive manufacturer's representative qualified as the "general manager in this State,"
quoted from prior California decisions on this point: "[Elvery object of the service is
obtained when the agent served is of sufficient character and rank to make it reason-
ably certain that the defendant will be apprised of the service made." Id. at 83, 346
P.2d at 413, quoting, Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736,
746, 307 P.2d 739, 745. Other cases where the agent served was found to be of suffi-
cient character and rank are: Bobrick Corp. v. American Dispenser Co., 377 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1967); Overland Machined Prods., Inc. v. Swingline, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d
46, 36 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1964); Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App.
2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957); Millbank v. Standard Motor Constr. Co., 132 Cal. App.
67, 22 P.2d 271 (1933); Roehl v. Texas Co., 107 Cal. App. 691, 291 P. 255 (1930).
In one case the agent served was not of sufficient character and rank. Nagel v. P & M.
Distribs., Inc., 273 A.C.A. 191, 78 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969).
Note that due to the uncertainty whether an independent contractor is of "suffi-
cient character and rank" to meet the requirements as a "general manager" in CAL.
CORP. CODE § 6500, the plaintiff evidently has the alternative of serving the Secretary
of State under CAL. CORP. CODE § 6501. See note 192 supra. See Regie Nationale
Des Usines Renault v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 704, 25 Cal. Rptr. 530,
531 (1962) (where the court indirectly approves this alternative); Detsch & Co. v.
Calbar, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 2d 556, 39 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1964); Brunzell Constr. Co.
v. Harrah's Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 734, 37 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1964); Waco-Porter
Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 2d 559, 27 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1963).
341. See, e.g., Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502,
17 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961); Prince v. Sonnie Gay, Ltd., 228 Cal. App. 2d 541, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 607 (1964); Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Harrah's Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 734, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 659 (1964); Overland Machined Prods., Inc. v. Swingline, Inc., 224 Cal. App.
2d 46, 36 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1964); Pope v. National Aero Fin. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d
709, 33 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963).
342. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Em-
pire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 829-30, 366 P.2d 502, 505-06, 17
Cal. Rptr. 150, 153-54 (1961).
343. See, e.g., Kesler v. Schetky Equip. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Cal. 1961),
344. CAL. INS. CODE § 1610.
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hold jurisdiction based upon Code of Civil Procedure section 411, sub-
division 2. The court recognized the adoption of the "minimum con-
tacts" theory by Jahn, but it was unable to find the requisite degree of
continuous activity within the state-a requirement it was not yet ready
to admit was made obsolete by McGee.345 The language in James R.
Twiss, Ltd. v. Superior Court46 in 1963, however, reflects the current
attitude that McGee is applicable to all types of foreign corporations
under section 411:
We construe the term [doing business] to mean any act or acts
creating such contact with the state as to make it reasonable to
require the foreign corporation to defend the particular suit which
is brought, providing the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
3 47
Even if the relevant act was technically executed outside California,
alleged consequences within California would be sufficient to sustain
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.348
"Doing Business" at Time of Service of Process
The requirement that a foreign corporation must be "doing busi-
ness" in California at the time of service of process3 40 has become obso-
lete with the expanded meaning attributed to the term "doing business."
Where the basis of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is an act or
acts creating a "contact" with the state, due process requirements are
met even though the corporation is "absent" at the time of service of
process.350 Consequently, although Corporations Code section 6504
provides for the acquisition of jurisdiction over "absent" foreign cor-
porations in certain circumstances, it would never be necessary351 to
345. 200 F. Supp. at 680-81.
346. 215 Cal. App. 2d 247, 30 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963).
347. Id. at 254, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (emphasis added); accord, Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Beirut
Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 832, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969);
A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968);
Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967).
348. See Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 832-33, 366
P.2d 502, 507-08, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155-56 (1961); SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS § 51.
349. See text accompanying notes 219-27 supra.
350. See Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 832, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1969); James R. Twiss, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 2d 247, 30
Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963); Emsco Pavement Breaking Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 176
Cal. App. 2d 760, 1 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1959). But see Detsch & Co. v. Calbar, Inc., 228
Cal. App. 2d 556, 39 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1964).
351. See Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 832, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1969), criticizing the opinion in Detsch & Co. v. Calbar, Inc., 228 Cal.
App. 2d 556, 39 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1964). In Detsch the court had stated: "[Slince Cal-
ifornia law provides for service only on withdrawn corporations which have trans-
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resort to section 6504.352 So long as the facts and circumstances meet
the liberal "doing business" requirements of Code of Civil Procedure
section 411,11" service of process on the Secretary of State is allowed
by Corporations Code section 6501, 314 which is incorporated by refer-
ence into section 411. Where the facts are not sufficient to meet the
requirements of section 411, they certainly would not be sufficient to
meet the requirements of section 6504.355
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court- A Further
Extension of "Doing Business"?
The term "doing business" was apparently extended by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in a 1969 decision, Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court.350 The court suggested that jurisdiction could be ac-
acted intrastate business [CAL. CORP. CODE § 6504] a foreign corporation engaged
solely in interstate commerce which ceases 'doing business' here before it is served
with process, is thereby able to avoid suit in this state." Id. at 567, 39 Cal. Rptr. at
633 (citations omitted). In direct contradiction of Detsch, the Beirut court stated:
"If the activity of the bank in California while [its president] was present constituted
the doing of business for purposes of jurisdiction, it is not reasonable to hold that such
jurisdictional effect lost all vitality with respect to the transaction involved in the
activity which brought it into being as soon as [the bank's president] left California
.... [T]he use of the words 'doing business in this state' in subdivision 2 of section
411 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not compel such a narrow interpretation."
268 Cal. App. 2d at 839-40, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
352. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 6504; see note 224 supra.
353. Cal. Stat 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 411(2) (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
354. CAL. CORP. CODE § 6501; see note 192 supra.
355. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 6504; see notes 224 & 226 supra.
356. 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). In arriving at its
decision the court recognized that since its decision in Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958), CAL. CODE Cxv. Pnoc. § 411(2)
(effective until July 1, 1970) exerts the full power of the state, consistent with the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, to subject a foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of a California court. Accordingly, the supreme court sees a court's
job as determining whether jurisdiction may be constitutionally assumed. In setting
out its view of the current constitutional guidelines, the court states: "A defend-
ant not literally 'present' in the forum state may not be required to defend itself in
that state's tribunals unless the 'quality and nature of the defendant's activity' in rela-
tion to the particular cause of action makes it fair to do so. Such a defendant's ac-
tivity must consist of 'an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State' or
'some [other] act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.' [Citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958)]. Further'-
more, unless the defendant's forum-related activity reaches such extensive or wide-
ranging proportions as to make the defendant sufficiently 'present' in the forum state
to support jurisdiction over it concerning causes of action which are unrelated to that
activity, the particular cause of action must arise out of or be connected with the d'e-
fendant's forum related activity. Once it is established that the defendant has engaged
in activity of the requisite quality and nature in the forum state and that the cause
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quired over the foreign manufacturer on either of two grounds: first,
if the plaintiffs cause of action arose from the corporation's economic
activity 57 in California; and second, if, although arising independently
of defendant's economic activity, the cause of action would be no more
burdensome for the defendant to defend than a cause of action arising
out of its economic activity within the state.3 5
Engaging in economic activity within the state is considered by the
court to be the equivalent of the due process requirement of purposeful
availment of the privilege of conducting activities within the state,
359
implicit in the McGee holding and first specifically expressed by the
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla. 60 The California court will find
this economic activity
whenever the purchase or use of [the manufacturer's] product
within the state generates gross income for the manufacturer and
is not so fortuituous or unforeseeable as to negative the existence
of an intent on the manufacturer's part to bring about this re-
sult. 361
The defendant's failure to allege that the use of its injury-causing
product within California was fortuituous and unforeseeable was held,
in itself, fatal to the defendant's petition for an order quashing service
of process. Absent such an allegation, the court presumed that the
cause of action arose from the corporation's economic activity in the
state.36 2
The second ground on which the court based its denial of the de-
fendant's petition seeking to quash the service of summons was the
most novel. The court said it would uphold jurisdiction where the de-
fendant failed to allege that defending the present action imposed a sub-
stantially greater burden than that of defending actions which might
have arisen from the corporation's single direct source of gross income
in California.3 6 3 In other words, the court appears to suggest that any
cause of action arising from a product which has entered the state for-
of action is sufficiently connected with this activity, the propriety of an assumption of
jurisdiction depends on the balancing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having
to defend itself in the forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing
locally and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction." Id. at
938-39, 458 P.2d at 61-62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
357. See text accompanying note 361 infra.
358. 71 A.C. at 945-47, 458 P.2d at 66-67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
359. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 941-42, 458 P.2d 57,
64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969); see Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53
Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
360. 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958). This case is summarized in note 299 supra.
361. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 942, 458 P.2d 57, 64,
80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1960).
362. Id. at 945-46, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
363. Id.
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tuitously is a sufficient "contact" to subject an out of state manufacturer
to California's jurisdiction, so long as, first, other products of the manu-
facturer have entered the state nonfortuitously (creating economic
activity) and, second, the burden of defending causes of action arising
from fortuitously entering products would be no greater than the
burden of defending causes of action arising from those products enter-
ing nonfortuitously.
Thus, it seems that California courts can now acquire jurisdiction
in cases where heretofore they would have denied jurisdiction on
grounds that the cause of action did not arise out of the corporation's
"contact" with the state. This raises the question: Has the California
court stretched the state's jurisdiction beyond that allowed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment? The considerations of
fair play and substantial justice implicit in the formulation and appli-
cation of the above rule would suggest a negative answer. The final
answer to that question, however, can come only from the United States
Supreme Court." 4
Conclusion
The contrasting dissimilarity between the limited power of a Cali-
fornia court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident indi-
vidual3 65 and its relatively unlimited power to acquire personal juris-
diction over a foreign corporation366 is the most important characteristic
of California's present jurisdictional system likely to be eradicated by
the new law. Presently, in the absence of consent or voluntary appear-
ance, the only bases for acquiring in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident individual are his presence in the state or his acts within the
state which bring him within the scope of one of several special statu-
utes.36 7 These special statutes-such as the nonresident motorist stat-
ute36 8 -are, however, very limited in scope. In contrast, the bases for
acquiring jurisdiction over foreign corporations in California have ex-
panded over the years to such an extent that any basis allowed by the
364. The case was sent back to the trial court with instructions giving the de-
fendant the opportunity to make the sort of evidentiary showing suggested above.
The reason the court gave the defendant this opportunity is that the defendant's posi-
tion in the trial court was significantly based on court of appeal decisions which the
court criticizes for their emphasis on a mechanical "checklist" approach; that approach
was criticized for its tendency to focus on the outward form of business transactions
rather than on economic reality. Id. at 943.46, 458 P.2d at 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
121-22.
365. See text accompanying notes 267-304 supra.
366. See text accompanying notes 305-64 supra.
367. See text accompanying notes 145-59, 289-97 supra.
368. CAL. VEu. CODE § 17451.
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Federal Constitution is allowed under the general California service of
process statute2" 9
The main problem in regard to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
individuals has centered around Code of Civil Procedure sections 412
and 413 .70 These sections, prior to Pennoyer v. Neff, allowed Cali-
fornia courts to render personal judgments3 71--enforceable only against
property within California since they were not entitled to full faith and
credit-against absent residents or absent nonresidents after service by
publication.?7s After Pennoyer, however, these service by publication
provisions were restricted in use to the acquisition of in rem or quasi in
rem jurisdiction.173  In 1953, a California decision 374 finally approved
the acquisition of personal jurisdiction under sections 412 and 413,
but this did not mean that California law had reverted to its status prior
to Pennoyer. In fact, rather strict limitations were placed upon the use
of sections 412 and 413 in acquiring personal jurisdiction by the en-
actment of Code of Civil Procedure section 4173 5 Under section 417,
as amended, the party must be personally served, as provided in section
413, and the party must be a domiciliary of California either when the
cause of action arises, the action is commenced or process is served.
Consequently, California's jurisdiction over individuals outside the state
has been limited to two classes of individuals: first, persons who meet
the requirements of section 417; second, nonresidents whose acts within
the state fall within the scope of a special statute.
The problems surrounding the development of the bases upon
which a court could acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
are unique. This is attributable to the intangible nature of the cor-
porate entity. Prior to the turn of the century, a corporation was deemed
incapable of leaving its state of incorporation; and although a cor-
poration could act in another state, it could do so only through the acts
of its representatives in that state. 7"
369. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 343, CAL. CODE CV. PRoc. § 411(2) (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970); see text accompanying notes 321-64 supra.
370. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 346, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 412 (effective
until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL. CODE Crv. PROC.
§ 413 (effective until July 1, 1970).
371. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
372. See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
373. See text accompanying notes 120-38 supra.
374. Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953); see text
accompanying notes 283-88 supra.
375. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
376. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856); Bank of




Domestic corporations caused few theoretical problems; like in-
dividuals within the state, they were always subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state on any transitory cause of action.177 The bases
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations, in the absence of consent or
voluntary appearance, however, were less clearly defined. First "im-
plied consent, 3 78 and later, constructive "presence, 3 79 were the terms
used by the Supreme Court to justify, as a matter of due process, the
assertion of jurisdiction by the state. Each of these fictions required
that the foreign corporation be "doing business" 80 within the state. It
was apparently no coincidence, therefore, that Code of Civil Procedure
section 411, subdivision 2,381 expressly required that a foreign corpora-
tion be "doing business" within the state; and California courts, when
they found it necessary to interpret this "doing business" statute did not
hesitate to adopt the Supreme Court's then current definition of the
term.
3 82
The abandonment of the "doing business" requirement by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington left California
courts without the leadership upon which they had consistently relied
in defining the limits of the "doing business" statute. It was not surpris-
ing, therefore, when the California Supreme Court declared that the
statutory "doing business" requirement was to be defined in terms of
the federally developed "minimum contact" test.s38  From that time, a
California court has been able to exercise its jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation on any basis that is not inconsistent with the federal due
process requirement. 38 4
In expressing its view of the current federal due process require-
ments, the California Supreme Court recently observed that two pre-
requisites are necessary to establish a valid basis of jurisdiction: The
defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state; and the circumstances must be such that the
assertion of jurisdiction by the state is fair and just.385 The latter pre-
requisite takes into account considerations implicit in the doctrine of
forum non conveniens: the inconvenience to the defendant in defend-
ing, the interest to the plaintiff in suing locally, and the interest of the
377. See text accompanying notes 176-78 supra.
378. See text accompanying notes 165-75 supra.
379. See text accompanying notes 207-18 supra.
380. See text accompanying notes 219-27 supra.
381. This statute becomes inoperative July 1, 1970.
382. See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra.
383. Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437
(1958).
384. See text accompanying notes 331-64 supra.
385. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969).
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state generally are qualitative factors to be weighed by the court. 38 6
Further, when the state-related activities of the corporation are not of
sufficiently extensive or wide-ranging proportions to support jurisdic-
tion over all causes of action, 87 then the cause of action sued upon
must arise out of or be connected with the state-related activity. This
activity may arise from acts done within the state, 3 8 acts done outside
the state causing effects within the state,3 89 and from the ownership,
use or possession of a thing in the state.39
While it has not been directly so held by the Supreme Court, it is
commonly accepted that the due process requirements set out in Inter-
national Shoe, and subsequent cases involving corporations, also apply
to individuals;391 this, of course, is the basis of the "long-arm" statutes
adopted by other states in recent years.392 The repeal of section 417, 39'
and the broad wording of the new basis of jurisdiction statute,394 give
California courts the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent individuals on the same bases as they now are able to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
395
The problems of fraud and gross abuse which plagued the Cali-
fornia courts in cases where personal jurisdiction was acquired by pub-
lication396 prior to Pennoyer v. Neff, are minimized under the new law
for two reasons. First, under sections 412 and 413, and their prede-
cessors in the Practice Act, there was little assurance in those times that
the defendant would actually receive notice where it was given by pub-
lication or registered mail. The service of process requirements under
the new law, presuming they meet the federal due process prerequisites
for adequate notice,39rseem to obviate this potential problem. Second,
386. See generally Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California: Code of Civil
Procedure Section 410.30, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1970).
387. Compare Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
388. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 36, 49.
389. See id. §§ 37, 50.
390. See id. § 51.
391. See Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 831, 345 P.2d 921, 924-25
(1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 292-97 supra.
392. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. Crv.
PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1963).
393. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 21, at 3373 (operative July 1, 1970).
394. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970); see note 5 supra.
395. Note that CAL. CORP. CODE § 15700 allowed the "minimum contacts" doc-
trine to be applied to foreign partnerships, but not to the members of the partnership
individually. See Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245, 295 P.2d
145 (1956).
396. See text accompanying notes 103-19 supra.
397. See generally Note, Substituted Service of Process on Individuals: Code of
Civil Procedure Section 415.20(b), 21 HAsTINGs L.J. 1257 (1970).
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the old sections left very little to the courts' discretion; once the require-
ments of the sections were satisfied, the court had to take jurisdiction.
The courts, often feeling obligated to deny jurisdiction in the interest
of justice, interpreted these statutes very strictly and often appeared
to be searching for technical grounds on which they could invalidate a
judgment obtained under these sections. Under the new law, the ele-
ments of fair play and substantial justice which accompany the "mini-
mum contacts" doctrine give a court broad discretionary power to ac-
cept or reject a case-thus, where fraud or abuse is present, reasons for
denying jurisdiction can now be stated in realistic terms.
The new law would also seem to allow a court to base its reasons
for acquiring in personam jurisdiction on realistic criteria. In Atkin-
son v. Superior Court,3"' the California Supreme Court clearly expressed
its desire to do so, 399 but was hampered by the limitations of Code of
Civil Procedure section 417. As an alternative, in order to reach the
merits of the case, the court found it necessary to extend quasi in rem
jurisdiction to its outer limits. 00 Theoretically, such judicial juggling
would not be necessary to acquire jurisdiction under the basis of juris-
diction section of the new law.
In adopting state and federal constitutional prerequisites as the
only statutory jurisdictional requirement, it might be argued that the
California legislature has opened the door to a great deal of litigation
because of the uncertainties inherent in such a statute. Disadvantages
arising from the statute, however, may be outweighed by the considera-
tions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in its application.
California's appellate courts, having decided a good many cases in-
volving the acquisition of jurisdiction over foreign corporations "doing
business" in the state,401 have experienced and have evidently weath-
ered the difficulties of applying the amorphous "minimum contacts"
doctrine to concrete factual situations. Just how many additional prob-
lems will be created for the courts under the new law by expanding
the opportunity to apply the "minimum contacts" doctrine to individuals
is a matter of conjecture. Whatever the practical difficulties encount-
ered, however, it is probable that the California courts will continue to
challenge some of the old classifications and distinctions and will base
398. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
399. Id. at 345, 316 P.2d at 964.
400. Id. at 346, 316 P.2d at 965. See generally Carrington, The Modern Util-
ity of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1962); Green,
Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HASTINGs L.L 1219 (1970).
401. See text accompanying notes 321-64 supra.
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their acquisition of jurisdiction on modem realities. 402
Peter G. de-Krassel and Barry A. Johnson*
402. See generally J. CouND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASES AND MATERIALS (1968), where the authors state: "Chief Justice Traynor plainly
suggested [in Atkinson v. Superior Court] that . . . all jurisdictional problems be ap-
proached as ones of the existence of minimum contacts between the forum and the
transaction in litigation. Surely this is not difficult to conceive in the present posture
of the law." Id. at 128. Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to Render
Judgments Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L.
REV. 339 (1958), where the author quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 423 (1957), writes: "'Strictly speaking, all
rights eventually are personal.' The categories of 'in personam,' 'in rem,' and 'quasi in
rem' are then not particularly helpful, and . . . may indeed be hindrances in working
out a solution to a particular basis-of-jurisdiction problem." Id. at 344. See also
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 660 (1959).
* Members, Second Year Class
